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Abstract 
 
Anabella Zagura 
An Account of Valuing 
(under the direction of Susan Wolf) 
 
This dissertation addresses the question: What is it to value something? Valuing is not 
reducible to a form of desire or belief. I suggest that valuing is a commitment to seeing an 
object as valuable, and argue that this way of understanding valuing explains its core 
characteristics and helps us to answer questions about love, special “oughts,” and 
meaningfulness in life. 
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Introduction 
 
 What is it to value something? 
 There are several angles from which one can approach this question, corresponding 
to different reasons to be interested in it. The most direct way in is pure curiosity about the 
nature of the attitudes we are capable of. We sometimes say of ourselves that we value a 
certain thing, and one may wonder what it is that we ascribe to ourselves when we talk this 
way. Is it a mental state on a par with beliefs, desires, hopes, wishes? Is it a species of 
belief or desire or of some other mental state? A sui generis mental state? A complex 
mental state? Is it a mental state at all, or is it a particular relationship we have with the 
valued object,1 or a mental state that stands in a certain relationship with the world,2 or 
perhaps something else?3 
 A different reason to be interested in the nature of valuing is its potential 
significance for a range of other interesting problems. Here are a few of them.  
                                                 
1
 Elizabeth Anderson, for example, suggests in her book Value in ethics and economics that in order to count 
as valuing something, one needs, among other things, to act in certain ways towards it.  
2
 Joshua Knobe and Erica Roebber argue that the criteria used by ordinary speakers in attributing the attitude 
of valuing include not only features internal to the agent, but also features of the valued object: a speaker will 
say that an agent values something only if the speaker thinks that the object of the agent’s attitude is, in fact, 
valuable. (J. Knobe & E. Roebber, “The ordinary concept of valuing”) 
3
 In order not to prejudge the answer to these questions, I will call valuing, broadly, an attitude.  
 2 
 One of the most robust contenders among value theories has it that we create value 
by valuing things.4 Any satisfying explanation of how value is created this way needs, I 
believe, a well-developed account of what it is to value something. In the absence of such 
an account, the claim that we infuse the world with value by valuing things can only sound 
mysterious, as if valuing were a magic wand by which we could bring into existence a new 
dimension to the world, value. Besides, there is a skeptical worry that there may be no 
attitude we are capable of that could create value as we conceive of it. If, for example, the 
only attitude we were capable of were desire, one might argue that the mere fact that we 
desire certain things is not sufficient to endow them with value: it is not sufficient to bring 
about the normativity endemic to value. When we say that something is valuable, we are 
saying, among other things, that we ought to act in certain ways towards it. But, the skeptic 
argues, the mere fact that we desire something cannot bring about this “ought.” To 
alleviate this skeptical worry, one would need either to explain how desire can, in fact, give 
rise to such an “ought,” or - more promisingly, I think - to show that we are capable of 
other attitudes that are normatively more potent. 
 Another direction in value theory is to analyze “X is valuable” as meaning “X is 
such that it would be appropriate to value it”5, or “X is such that an agent would value it 
under ideal conditions”6, or the like. Here, again, in order to give substance to these claims, 
one needs an account of valuing and of its appropriateness conditions.  
 A different cluster of questions for which an account of valuing matters revolves 
around personhood, free agency, moral responsibility, and autonomy. In inquiring into 
                                                 
4
 For a paradigmatic case, see Christine Korsgaard’s Sources of normativity. 
5
 See, for example: T. M. Scanlon, What we owe to each other; Elizabeth Anderson, Value in ethics and 
economics; Gerald Gaus, Value and Justification.  
6
 See David Lewis: “Dispositional theories of value”.  
 3 
what makes us persons, some have argued that the capacity for valuing plays a central 
role.7 The plausibility of this claim will depend in part on what the capacity to value 
amounts to. To take another issue, free agency is notoriously impossible to explain simply 
as freedom from external constraints. The fact that an action was motivated by a mental 
state internal to the agent does not necessarily mean that the agent acted out of his own free 
will: consider compulsions and addictions. Some philosophers think that we can make 
progress in understanding free agency by distinguishing between motives of the agent that 
are part of the agent’s self, that represent his will, and motives that don’t.8 Since we 
commonly take actions that stem from our values to be most truly our own, it has been 
suggested that we can understand free agency in terms of the capacity to have one’s 
motivational system in sync with one’s valuational system.9 Relatedly, one of the 
conditions for moral responsibility is attributability: an agent can only be responsible for 
an action that is his own. But what makes an action one’s own? “Being motivated by a 
mental state of the agent,” again, does not look like a good answer: we sometimes seem to 
excuse agents whose actions are motivated by overwhelming emotions, uncontrollable 
impulses, or unconscious motives on the grounds that it wasn’t really them who was 
acting: it was their anger, or their craving, or their anxiety. We often conceive of such 
mental states as external to the agent’s self and in conflict with it: “His anger took over,” 
“Her fear was stronger than her,” “This isn’t him speaking, it’s his depression.” If this 
means that actions motivated by such mental states are not attributable to the agent in the 
sense relevant for moral responsibility, then we need a different explanation of what makes 
                                                 
7
 See Christine Korsgaard, “Kant’s formula of Humanity,” in her Creating the Kingdom of ends;  Harry 
Frankfurt, “Freedom of the will and the concept of a person”.  
8
 See Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the will and the concept of a person”.  
9
 Gary Watson, “Free agency”. 
 4 
an action one’s own, and an account of valuing is a possible starting point.10 Similarly, 
some have appealed to the attitude of valuing to explain autonomy: if valuing is central to 
or constitutive of one’s self, we can understand self-determination as determination by 
one’s values.11 
 Yet another concern that can lead one to be interested in what it is to value 
something pertains to what it takes to have a good life. We think that there is something 
valuable about the various positive ways in which we can engage with things of value: the 
aesthetic appreciation of a good work of art or a beautiful landscape, respect for people, 
love, caring. Moreover, we think that these ways of engaging make an important 
contribution to a good life.12 The life of a person who had knowledge, talent, 
accomplishments, health, friends, virtue, and things similarly valuable, but did not value 
them, seems to fall short of being good. Such a life doesn’t seem merely to lack one 
valuable thing among others. What’s wrong with it is not that it could be made better by 
adding one more valuable thing, the agent’s valuing what he has. Rather, the absence of 
valuing seems to take away from knowledge, talent, accomplishments and the like the 
ability to make that life good. But why is this so – what is the distinctive contribution that 
valuing makes to a good life?  
 These various concerns with which one can approach the question “what is it to 
value something?” are, of course, very much interconnected. The supposed capacity of 
valuing to create value is pertinent to the significance of valuing for personhood; the 
                                                 
10
 See John M. Fischer, “Responsibility and self-expression”.  
11
 See Michael Bratman, “Autonomy and hierarchy” and “Valuing and the will”.  
12
 See Stephen Darwall, Welfare and rational care (esp. chapter 4, “Valuing activity: Golub’s smile”); Joseph 
Raz, Value, respect, and attachment; Harry Frankfurt, “The importance of what we care about,” and Reasons 
for love; Susan Wolf, “Happiness and meaning: two aspects of the good life”.  
 5 
centrality of valuing to personhood may account for the place valuing has in one’s self, and 
thus for its role in free agency, moral responsibility and agency. And the importance of 
valuing to a good life surely has something to do both with its role in creating value, and 
with its centrality to one’s self, personhood and free agency.  
 In addition to a pure interest in the nature of the attitudes of which we are capable, 
my interest in an account of valuing comes largely from questions about what makes a life 
good, and my approach will reflect this perspective. I will not attempt to answer questions 
about whether and how valuing can give rise to value, or whether one can use valuing to 
explain personhood, free agency, moral responsibility or autonomy. However, given the 
links between the different problems surrounding valuing, my discussion will at times 
touch on some of these issues.  
 In most discussions of valuing, the nature of valuing is only of secondary interest.13 
Insofar as philosophers who make use of the notion offer an account of valuing at all, it is 
merely as a stepping stone for a theory of value, autonomy, or free agency.  
 Take, for example, philosophers interested in a theory of value. Thomas Scanlon 
wants to analyze the claim that X is valuable as the claim that X is properly valued, and for 
this purpose he defines valuing something as “taking oneself to have reasons for holding 
certain positive attitudes toward it and for acting in certain ways toward it.”14 Elizabeth 
Anderson in Value in Ethics and Economics is primarily interested in giving an account of 
value and rationality. She maintains that to judge something valuable is to judge that it 
makes sense for someone to value it – where “making sense” is a rationality concept. To 
value something is to have a complex of positive attitudes towards it, governed by distinct, 
                                                 
13
 One notable exception is Michael Bratman’s paper “Valuing and the will”.  
14
 Thomas Scanlon, What we owe to each other, p. 95. 
 6 
socially determined standards for perception, deliberation, emotion, and conduct. 
According to Gerald Gaus in his book Value and Justification to judge something valuable 
is to judge that it is worthy of being valued - where to value something is to experience a 
positive dispositional emotion towards it.  
 There are two ways of construing the differences between these authors. One way 
is to think that they all agree on the fact that value is to be explained in terms of the 
appropriateness of a certain attitude – valuing - and disagree on what that attitude consists 
in. On this interpretation, their conceptions of value carve out one attitude we can have 
towards things and propose competing accounts of its nature.  
 But this is not the only way – and perhaps not the most plausible one - of 
interpreting the debate. For the authors’ apparent agreement on what it is for something to 
be valuable may be merely apparent, and may consist only in their use of the same term, 
“valuing.” All they may agree on is that value is in a certain sense grounded in an attitude, 
to which they all apply the same term. But their use of that term does not guarantee that 
they have all identified one attitude, about whose nature they disagree. They may simply 
be talking about different attitudes and reactions people can have towards things, and 
disagree in their views on value. Where one thinks that value is grounded in emotional 
dispositions, for example, another thinks it is grounded in reasons for various positive 
reactions, including actions and attitudes. Thus “valuing” might be a rather technical term 
that has different meanings in the context of their different theories.  
  It is quite possible that the common-sense notion of valuing does not pick out a 
single attitude either. This wouldn’t be surprising or peculiar; it seems to be equally true of 
some other psychological notions: desire, love, happiness. After all, the verb “to value” is 
 7 
used in a variety of different contexts: people say they value their friends, their children, 
particular books, paintings, activities; abstract entities such as justice, friendship, honesty; 
but also things like their car, money, their free time, each other’s privacy; my bank says 
they value my business. It is unlikely that the term refers to the same attitude in all these 
contexts.  
 Nonetheless, the thought driving this essay is that at least one use of the verb “to 
value” (presumably, a core use) points towards an attitude that is interestingly different 
from other, more familiar, attitudes, and that a better understanding of this attitude (which I 
shal from now on simply call valuing) yields important results. 
 What I propose to do, then, is this. First, I will argue that valuing cannot be reduced 
to a form of belief or desire. Next, I will outline a positive account of valuing. These tasks 
occupy chapter one. The remaining three chapters are meant primarily to support my 
positive account of valuing by displaying its explanatory power. The main goal of chapter 
two is to show that, if we apply the proposed account of valuing to love, we can solve 
some of the puzzles that arise in thinking about love. In chapter three I argue that the 
account helps explain some of the special “oughts” to which we are subject; in particular, 
the peculiar nature of duties of friendship. Chapter four suggests an explanation of the 
distinctive role of valuing in a good life.  
  
Chapter 1: An account of valuing 
 
I A criticism of attempts to reduce valuing to desire or belief. 
1) Desire. 
 A first conception of valuing one might have is that valuing X consists simply in 
desiring X. On this view, to say that I value my friendship with John is to say that I desire 
to have, or to continue to have, a friendship with John. To say that I value my life is to say 
that I desire to stay alive; and so on.  
 As a point about the way we use the word “value,” I believe it is true that we 
sometimes use it to talk about what we desire. When people say that they value something, 
sometimes they simply mean that they want it, or that they want it very much. When I say 
that I value money, or that I value silence at night, or that I value having a family and 
children, I may be saying that I want very much to have money, to have silence at night, or 
to have a family and children. This seems to be a legitimate way of using the word “to 
value.” But it doesn’t seem to be the only, or even the primary, way of using the word. 
Although it may be plausible that when I say that I value silence at night, I mean that I 
desire it, there are many other cases where this is not what we mean. 
  When a friend tells Mary: “Your boyfriend seems to be a good guy, and it sounds 
like he values you,” she is not telling Mary that her boyfriend desires her. This, of course, 
is not a fatal problem for someone who claims that talk of valuing is talk of desiring. The 
reductionist may acknowledge that, strictly speaking, saying that A values X does not 
 9 
mean that A desires X. But, he will insist, what it means is that A has certain desires 
pertaining to X. What those desires are may depend on the nature of X, and vary with the 
context. Nevertheless, talk about valuing can be fully understood in terms of desires. For 
example, the reductionist will suggest, when I say that the boyfriend values Mary, what I 
am saying is that he wants her to do well, that he wants her in his life, and the like.  
 The philosophical literature on desire commonly acknowledges a distinction 
between two different uses of the term “desire.” On the one hand, we have psychological 
states such as appetites (hunger, thirst, sexual appetite), cravings, urges, wishes, hopes, and 
the like. Sometimes – and this is the most common use of the word “desire” in everyday 
language – we use “desire” to refer to such psychological states, and to set them apart from 
other states such as beliefs about what we should do, decisions, or intentions. It is this 
sense of the term that we use when we say things like: “I helped my brother with his 
homework, although I had no desire to do so,” or “I don’t really want to go to this party, 
but I’ve decided to be more social, so I’ll go.” On the other hand, we are inclined to say 
that if you intentionally helped your brother with his homework, then you must have 
wanted to do so, and since nobody dragged you to the party, the fact that you went shows 
that you did want to go. In such cases, what we are saying is that, since the agent acted 
intentionally, he must have been motivated to act; but that says nothing about the nature of 
that motivation. What we are insisting on is not that the intentionally acting agent must 
have been moved by a psychological state qualitatively similar to cravings and wishes, and 
different from beliefs or intentions, but merely that the agent must have been motivated to 
 10 
act. Following G. F. Schueler, let’s call the first kind of desires “desires proper,” and the 
second kind “pro-attitudes.”15 
 Now, even though in some contexts we may be using the term “valuing” to refer to 
desires proper, often interpreting talk of valuing in this way seems inaccurate. I can value 
honesty without having a desire proper to be honest. On the other hand, we are reluctant to 
say of someone who has no motivation to be honest that he values honesty.16 And, again, if 
one is interested in the way language is used, it seems true that sometimes we use 
“valuing” to refer vaguely to some pro-attitude. However, more often than not, when we 
say that someone values something, we want to say more than that he has some positive 
motivation with respect to it. “Your boyfriend values you,” “I value your friendship,” “I 
value honesty” are cases in point. But, again, that something more that we want to convey 
is not that the motivation has the quality of a desire proper.  
 Now, one might agree with this point about the use of the verb “to value,” i.e., one 
might agree that at least in some cases “to value” is not synonymous with “to desire” in 
either of its senses, but claim that whatever attitude the term “valuing” refers to in those 
                                                 
15
 Schueler himself inherits the term “pro-attitudes” from Donald Davidson. Both my terminology here and 
my way of drawing the distinction between desires proper and pro-attitudes follow closely Schueler’s 
discussion in his book Desire: its role in practical reason and the explanation of action (see esp. pp. 29-38). 
Similar distinctions are drawn by Wayne Davis in “The two senses of desire,” Joel Marks in “The difference 
between motivation and desire,” Mitchell Staude in “”Wanting, desiring, and valuing: the case against 
conativism”. These articles are part of Joel Marks’ anthology The ways of desire: new essays in philosophical 
psychology on the concept of wanting. 
16
 Although this claim seems for the most part true, there are complications. Someone who suffers from 
depression might have little motivation to do anything, and, for this reason, many are inclined to say that 
depression affects one’s capacity to value. When you’re severely depressed, you can’t value anything. My 
own inclination is actually to resist this conclusion. Imagine a clinically depressed mother whose 
motivational system is so affected by depression that she cannot get out of bed. She cannot motivate herself 
to take care of her children, play or interact with them. However, she insists that she still values her children 
very much. I think that her claim may be true. On the view of valuing I will develop later, it will turn out that 
the motivation to act in certain ways towards the valued object is not constitutive of valuing. Rather, the 
things that are constitutive of valuing entail, inter alia, a disposition to be so motivated. I think that 
depression can prevent that disposition from being actualized, without destroying the disposition itself or the 
configuration of attitudes behind it. 
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cases is ultimately analyzable in terms of desires of some sort.17 I believe that this view is 
false. Its main (fatal) problem is that it fails to capture the relationship between valuing and 
reasons. 
 Here are some examples offered by Gary Watson: “Consider the case of a woman 
who has a sudden urge to drown her bawling child in the bath; or the case of a squash 
player who, while suffering an ignominious defeat, desires to smash his opponent in the 
face with the racquet. It is just false that the mother values her child’s being drowned or 
that the player values the injury and suffering of his opponent. But they desire these things 
none the less. They desire them in spite of themselves. It is not that they assign these 
actions an initial value which is then outweighed by other considerations. These actions are 
not even represented by a positive entry, however small, on the initial ‘desirability 
matrix’.”18 
 These examples bring out, I believe, two differences between desire and valuing.19 
The mother desires to drown the baby without seeing any reasons whatsoever for drowning 
it. She does not see, for example, the fact that drowning the baby will make it stop bawling 
and thus stop irritating her as a reason to drown it. The thought that drowning it will make 
it stop crying might cause her desire to drown it, but not because she takes this fact to be a 
reason. It seems impossible, however, to value an action while seeing no reasons 
                                                 
17
 I will discuss a concrete instance of this approach in chapter 2, when I criticize the view that loving a 
person consists in a set of desires regarding that person. 
18
 Gary Watson, “Free agency,” p. 101. Watson himself goes on to argue that to value X is to believe X to be 
valuable. What the examples show, according to him, is that one can desire to do something and at the same 
time believe that there is no value whatsoever in doing so; whereas one cannot value doing something and 
believe that there is no value in doing it. I actually disagree with (at least a certain interpretation of) his latter 
claim; but I think that the examples do illustrate some important differences between valuing and desiring, 
which I will discuss presently. 
19
 In what follows I will use “desire” in a way that preserves the ambiguity between desire proper and pro-
attitude; I think that ambiguity does not affect the points I am about to make. 
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whatsoever for performing that action. If I say that I value telling the truth, but there are no 
reasons whatsoever to tell the truth, I don’t seem to make much sense. Similarly, if I say 
that I value playing the guitar, but I see no reasons to ever play the guitar. 
 Here is a second difference the example brings out. Not only does the mother see 
the fact that killing the baby would shut it up as no reason to kill it; she also sees her own 
desire to drown the baby as no reason whatsoever to do so. As Watson points out, it is not 
that she takes that desire to give her only a very weak, easily overridden reason to kill the 
baby; she ascribes no reason-giving force at all to her own desire. This doesn’t seem to be 
the case with the attitude of valuing. It seems odd, if not unintelligible, to say that I value 
doing philosophy, but my valuing it gives me no reason whatsoever to do it.20 
 One might object at this point that Watson-type examples show nothing about the 
differences between valuing and desire, because the attitudes involved in the examples are 
urges, and we should distinguish between urges and desires. Thus, one may defend the 
view that, while one can have an urge to do something without seeing any reasons to do it, 
desiring X constitutively involves seeing X as good, or in some other way as to-be-
pursued, and thus as reason-giving; and that, unlike urges, one’s desires always give one a 
prima facie reason, however feeble, to pursue them.21  
 Now, one may argue about whether this conception of desire is adequate. But even 
if it is wrong as a general account of desire, there are no reasons to think that there isn’t a 
kind of desire that involves seeing its object as good. Is valuing to be understood as that 
(sub)type of desire?  
                                                 
20
 I will discuss this point in more detail later.  
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 Here is a reason to think that it isn’t. Valuing is stable in time in a way desire is not. 
I can have a desire for ice cream for only one hour, but I cannot value friendship for only 
one hour. 
 One could reply here by pointing out that some desires we have are stable in time: 
the desire to survive, the desire for happiness, the desire for the well-being of the people 
we love. Perhaps valuing is reducible to this kind of desire: desire which involves seeing 
its object as good and is stable in time.  
 I believe that valuing cannot be equated with this kind of desire, and that reflecting 
on why this is so will bring us closer to an understanding of what is distinctive of valuing. 
Some desires are stable, some are not. When a desire is stable, its stability is a contingent 
fact about it: it is not a necessary feature of its being a desire, that it be stable. But the 
stability of valuing does not seem to be contingent. If I “value” friendship now, but stop 
tomorrow, and “value” it again next week, I simply do not count as valuing friendship.  
 This might seem to be a trivial point about the way we use the verb “to value”: we 
only call “valuing” an attitude that is stable in time. If my desire for friendship happens to 
be stable in time, it will count as valuing; if not, it won’t. Perhaps the whole point of using 
the term “value” is to distinguish between desires that are stable and those that aren’t. 
There is no deeper necessity to the stability of valuing than that established by the meaning 
of the term. 
 The only way to assuage this worry is, I think, to develop a plausible account of 
valuing that shows how the necessity of stability for valuing reflects something about the 
nature of valuing, and not merely a rule for the application of the term. I will present such 
an account in the second part of this chapter. For now, let us assume the truth of the claim 
 14 
that the stability of valuing is not simply the result of semantic stipulation, and address the 
worry that a reductionist might explain stability by further specifying the kind of desire 
valuing consists in. 
 Some desires are accompanied by second-order desires for their continuation. My 
desire to be productive is accompanied by a desire to continue to desire to be productive; 
so are my desires to be fit, nice, interested in the world. When my desire to be productive 
or fit is stable, its stability could be the result of my second-order desire to continue to do 
so. Even though stability is not a necessary feature of desires, in the case of some desires – 
i.e., those desires accompanied by second-order desires for their continuation - it is not 
completely accidental either: were my desire to be fit to waver, it would be rekindled by 
my second-order desire to desire to be fit.  
David Lewis has proposed that to value something is to desire to desire it.22 Harry 
Frankfurt, in “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” can also be interpreted as 
arguing that valuing consists in having a certain kind of second-order desires.23 What is 
                                                 
22
 Lewis makes this suggestion in the context of offering a subjective account of value in his “Dispositional 
theories of value”. His main interest is in defining value (as what we would be disposed, under ideal 
conditions, to value), and his discussion of valuing is brief. The only support he offers for the claim that to 
value something is to desire to desire it emerges from a criticism of the idea that to value is to desire. The 
thoughtful addict, he points out, may desire his euphoric daze, but not value it. He desires his high, but does 
not desire to desire it; instead, he desires to desire a mundane state of consciousness. “We conclude,” Lewis 
says, “that he does not value what he desires, but rather he values what he desires to desire.” (p. 71) If one 
were to take this as an argument for the claim that to value is to desire to desire, it would of course be too 
quick. If in one case what one values is aligned to what one desires to desire, it doesn’t follow that valuing 
consists in desiring to desire. Lewis’s assumption may be that the reason why we think the addict doesn’t 
value being high is that he doesn’t desire to desire to be high; but this is still insufficient for equating valuing 
with desiring to desire. If valuing X were, say, a belief that X is valuable, and we would have a general desire 
to be motivated in accordance with our value beliefs, the fact that the addict doesn’t desire to desire to be 
high would be an indication that he doesn’t value being high, but valuing and desiring to desire would be 
different attitudes. 
23
  Frankfurt does not explicitly talk about valuing in this article, or offer his view on second-order desires as 
an analysis of valuing. However, he believes that having second-order desires of the kind mentioned above is 
essentially distinctive of persons, that second-order desires are what constitutes one’s identity, and that one 
makes the will one’s own through such desires. This suggests that he is trying to capture the same attitude as 
authors who explicitly talk about valuing. 
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distinctive about persons, he says, is that they are not merely moved one way or another by 
their desires to act in a certain way. Unlike other creatures, people care about what desires 
they have, and about what desires move them. They have not only desires about what to 
do, but also desires about what to desire. To value something is to desire to be moved by 
your desires for it. 
The main objection against this view is that second-order desires are themselves, 
after all, simply desires. Their being second-order does not confer a special status on 
them.24 If one sees first-order desires as mere occurrences in the agent’s mental life, to 
which the agent is subject in a rather passive way, and which as such do not have a reason-
giving force, there seems to be no reason why one shouldn’t see second-order desires as 
well as such occurrences with no reason-giving force. Frankfurt’s view doesn’t seem to 
fare much better than the simple desire view in accounting for the relationship between 
valuing and reasons.  
Suppose that I desire to have an effective, stable desire to smoke cigarettes. I have 
this second-order desire because my group of friends are all smokers and think it’s cool to 
be addicted to smoking. It doesn’t look like having this second-order desire makes it the 
case that I value smoking. Perhaps in this case I value having a stable desire to smoke; but 
even that doesn’t have to be true; I might just be knowingly giving in to peer pressure. My 
desire to smoke is stable, but its stability doesn’t seem to be of the sort that is characteristic 
of valuing. 
Perhaps there are other ways of further specifying a subtype of desire that would 
come closer to a characterization of valuing. I have considered here what I take to be the 
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 Gary Watson makes this point in “Free Agency”.  
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major contestants. In the second part of this chapter, I will develop a non-reductionistic 
account of valuing that will attempt to show that there is no need to try to understand 
valuing as a type of desire. 
2. Belief 
At the other end of the spectrum, one can hold that to value X is to believe X to be 
good or valuable. Gary Watson defends this view in “Free Agency”25. .”.. An agent’s 
values,” he says, “consist in those principles and ends which he - in a cool and non-self-
deceptive moment - articulates as definitive of the good, fulfilling, and defensible life.” 26 
Equating valuing with believing to be good may lead to difficulties because valuing 
is a motivating attitude, whereas it is not clear that beliefs can motivate. Suppose though, 
for the sake of the argument, that value beliefs can motivate. There are still other reasons to 
resist the identification of valuing with believing to be good. 
Notice, first, that valuing admits of degree in a way different from belief. Suppose I 
value music more than I value painting. Someone who claims that to value X is to believe 
that X is valuable would have to explain this difference either as a difference in the degree 
of confidence in my belief, or as a difference in the content of my belief (i.e., I believe that 
music is more valuable than painting.) But neither of these captures what it is to value 
music more than painting. I can believe, with the same degree of confidence, that music is 
valuable and that painting is valuable, and also that they are equally valuable. Still, I may 
value one more than the other. When I say that I value music more than painting, I say 
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 He revokes it later in “Free action and free will”. 
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 Gary Watson, “Free agency,” p. 346. Michael Smith also suggests that valuing is a kind of belief: to value 
X is to believe that you would desire X if you were fully rational. (Michael Smith, The moral problem, pp. 
147-181.) Smith’s view is subject to the same objections as Watson’s.  
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something about myself and my relationship to the arts, rather than about the arts 
themselves. If someone asks me “Why do you value music more than painting?” an answer 
that talks about me and says virtually nothing about features of music or painting can be 
perfectly appropriate. “I grew up in a house where everyone was a musician, and I’ve been 
playing and listening to music since I was five. Music has always been a big part of my 
life, and it is when I play music that I am at my happiest. I couldn’t imagine living my life 
without music. I don’t deny that painting is as valuable as music, but it doesn’t mean as 
much to me.” 
At this point one might say: OK, valuing X is different from believing that X is 
valuable. But perhaps to value X is to believe that X is valuable to me. Perhaps when I say 
that I value music more than painting, what I’m expressing is a belief that music is more 
valuable to me than the other arts. This is compatible with saying that music and painting 
are equally valuable. 
But the mere belief that music is more valuable to me than painting is not sufficient 
for me to value music more. If anything, it has to be the case that music is more valuable to 
me. In the example above, if I just woke up from a dream and, confused, I believe that I 
grew up in a family of musicians, and that music is my life, my (false) belief that music is 
thus valuable to me doesn’t make it the case that I value music; music has to (in this 
particular example) be my life, make me happy, etc.  
Perhaps, then, when one says that A values X, what one says is that X is valuable to 
A. Now, as a point about the use of language, I think that this is sometimes true. “I value 
music” and “Music is valuable to me” sometimes express the same thought. Not always 
though. There are cases where the active involvement of the agent expressed by the verb is 
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salient. Imagine that I am, again, the person described in the example above, and my 
parents are worried that I do not value music enough: “We’ve invested so much in your 
musical education, and you’re so talented, and we know that music is really valuable to 
you, we know how happy and fulfilled you can be when you’re into it, but lately you’re not 
practicing enough, and you hang out all the time with those drunkard painters. You should 
value it more!” I might protest, “I do value it, I just need a break, and will start practicing 
again with renewed energy in a few weeks.” Here what is at stake is not how valuable 
music is to the agent; both the parents and the agent agree on that. What is under dispute is 
the agent’s active involvement with what is valuable to her: her attitude, the actions (or 
lack thereof) expressive of her attitude. What is at stake is something the agent can be held 
responsible (in this case, blamed) for. The extent to which X is valuable to A is not 
something A can appropriately be held responsible for; the extent to which A values X is. 
 
Let’s go back to the idea that to value X is to believe that X is valuable 
(simpliciter). I will argue that this belief is neither necessary, nor sufficient for valuing X. 
That believing X is valuable is not sufficient for valuing X is shown by the 
difference between the way valuing admits of degree and the way belief admits of degree. 
Let’s consider now the claim that the belief that X is valuable is necessary for valuing X. 
Consider the case of Huckleberry Finn, as described by Jonathan Bennett or Nomy 
Arpaly.27 Huckleberry Finn believes that he must turn in his friend Jim, because Jim is a 
runaway slave. However, Huckleberry Finn finds himself incapable of turning Jim in, 
although he believes that it would be the right thing to do. There are various ways of 
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 J. Bennett, “The conscience of Huckleberry Finn”. Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue, pp. 75-78. 
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interpreting what is going on with Huck, and why he doesn’t turn his friend in. But here is 
one possible story that seems plausible to me. According to Huck’s indoctrinated beliefs, 
Jim is his owner’s property, and ought to be returned to them. But in the course of their 
close interaction as friends, Huck comes to see Jim as a being very much like himself. He 
comes to see Jim as someone capable of having fun, suffering, being a friend, wanting to 
be free, etc., and he comes to value Jim as a being of this kind. So, even though his beliefs 
entail that he ought to turn Jim in, and he fully believes that he ought to do so, he finds 
himself incapable of doing so. Why? Because turning Jim in would be incompatible with 
his other attitudes towards Jim, with the way he has come to see and value Jim. It is not the 
case that Huck has contradictory beliefs: that he both believes that Jim is the kind of being 
who belongs to his masters, and at the same time that Jim is not that kind of being. He is of 
one mind in his beliefs: he is fully convinced that Jim belongs to his masters, and that he 
ought to turn him in. But valuing Jim as a person with equal standing need not involve any 
beliefs about Jim’s value28. 
II A different account of valuing 
I can desire to be friends with John without seeing any reasons to be friends with 
him. I believe that John is shallow and conceited, and I know that my desire to be his 
friend is purely the result of peer pressure: John is very popular, and my knowing that 
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 One may object here that Huck seems to have an implicit belief that Jim is valuable; that Huck’s feelings, 
thoughts and reactions are a sign that Huck believes, in fact, that Jim is valuable, even though he is not aware 
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person has feelings, thoughts and reactions typical of valuing X, they can be seen as a sign that the person 
implicitly believes that X is valuable. 
Whether or not one agrees with this suggestion will depend on one’s views on what should count as an 
(implicit) belief. I will not enter that debate here. If one’s criteria for implicit beliefs are inclusive enough, I 
would agree that valuing X involves believing that X is valuable (more on this later). The more important 
claim is that a belief – be it implicit or explicit - that X is valuable is not sufficient for valuing X. 
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everyone wants to be friends with him makes me want it as well. It’s not that I think that 
everyone’s being friends with John is a reason to be friends with him. I don’t see any such 
reason. Nevertheless, I find myself with a desire to be his friend.  
It wouldn’t make sense to say that I value being friends with John, but I see no 
reason to be friends with him. I can, of course, value being friends with him, and see some 
overriding reasons against it – his wife, say, disapproves. But if I tell you that I value his 
friendship, but see no reasons whatsoever to be friends with him, you may rightly wonder 
what I mean. If, to my mind, there is nothing about his friendship that makes it worth 
having, or gives me a reason to want it, then talk about valuing it is misplaced.  
This suggests that seeing certain facts about X as reasons for certain actions, 
thoughts, and/or attitudes is an essential feature of valuing X. It matters, of course, what 
kinds of facts about X one sees as reasons, and what kinds of actions or attitudes one sees 
them as reasons for. If I see the fact that John is popular as a reason to be friends with him 
and thus become more popular myself, I do not necessarily value his friendship; if I see the 
fact that he is a sensitive guy as a reason to be mean to him, I don’t thereby value him. 
However, as long as we talk about valuing in general, it is virtually impossible to give a 
precise, concrete account of the nature of the reasons, actions and attitudes valuing 
involves. They will vary widely depending on the kind of valuing in question - romantic 
love, parental love, friendship-love, respect for the person as a person, respect for the 
person as a great violinist, consideration, etc. They will also depend on the nature of the 
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valued object, on the nature of one’s relationship with it, and on the context. One can be 
(somewhat) more specific only if one talks about particular kinds of valuing.29  
One can see that certain things are reasons, but at the same time be disconnected 
from, or indifferent to, their reason-giving force. I can, for example, see that the fact that 
world peace would save the lives of millions is a reason to fight for world peace, without 
seeing that reason as speaking directly to me; without seeing myself as having a reason to 
militate for world peace. When one values something, one doesn’t merely see that certain 
facts about it are reasons; one also sees oneself as bound by those reasons. Thomas 
Scanlon takes something like this to be the central characteristic of valuing: “To value 
something is to take oneself to have reasons for holding certain positive attitudes toward it 
and for acting in certain ways with regard to it. Exactly what these reasons are, and what 
actions and attitudes they support, will be different in different cases. They generally 
include, as a common core, reasons for admiring the thing and for respecting it, although 
‘respecting’ can involve quite different things in different cases. Often, valuing something 
involves seeing reasons to preserve and protect it (as, for example, when I value a historic 
building); in other cases it involves reasons to be guided by the goals and standards that the 
value involves (as when I value loyalty); in some cases both may be involved (as when I 
value the U.S. constitution).”30 
I believe that Scanlon’s remarks on what it is to value something bring out at least 
two important points. For one thing, as noted before, they point out that seeing oneself as 
having reasons for certain actions is a central feature of valuing something. But suppose 
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 Scanlon, What we owe to each other, p. 95. 
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we accept the view that desiring X entails seeing X under the guise of the good, and thus 
entails seeing oneself as having a reason to pursue X. If we were to accept that to value X 
is to desire it, it would follow that a person who desires X sees herself as having a reason 
to pursue it. So far a reductionist view that equates valuing X with desiring X seems 
compatible with Scanlon’s points. But Scanlon’s remarks also bring to light the fact that 
valuing is far more complex than desire. Unlike desiring X, which involves seeing oneself 
as having a reason to pursue X, and also perhaps a reason to desire it, valuing X involves 
seeing oneself as having a variety of reasons for different actions and attitudes. When I 
desire John’s friendship, I may thereby see myself as having a reason to pursue, or 
maintain, a friendship with John. But if I value the friendship, Scanlon points out, I see 
myself as having reasons not merely to promote the friendship, but also to guide my 
actions by the ideal of being a good friend. “A person who values friendship will take 
herself to have reasons, first and foremost, to do those things that are involved in being a 
good friend: to be loyal, to be concerned with her friend’s interests, to try to stay in touch, 
to spend time with her friends, and so on.”31  
A reductionist might say at this point that all he has to give up is the simple view 
that valuing X consists in desiring X; but nothing Scanlon said rules out the option that 
valuing X consists in a set of desires pertaining to X. To value one’s friendship with John 
is to desire to maintain it, and to desire to do those things involved in being a good friend: 
to be loyal, to help John when he needs help, etc. 
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Suppose that the reductionist could avoid the problems discussed in part I. One 
question he would have to answer is: why does valuing friendship involve this particular 
set of desires, and not some other? Are these desires connected to each other in some way? 
A non-reductionist faces the same question. Here is one way he might try to answer 
it. Though perhaps not reducible to belief, valuing X involves, our non-reductionist will 
say, a belief that X is valuable. To take an example, valuing friendship involves a belief 
that friendship is valuable. It is part of the content of that belief that there are reasons to 
develop friendships, to maintain them, to guide one’s actions by the standards and ideals of 
friendship. Therefore, to believe that friendship is valuable is to believe that there are these 
reasons. Therefore, valuing friendship involves seeing oneself as having these reasons.  
Someone who subscribes to this view would have to defend the claim that a belief 
that X is valuable is (perhaps among other things) a belief about such reasons. I will grant, 
for the sake of the argument, that this claim is true.32 I will argue, however, that the reasons 
one sees oneself as having when one values X are typically not the same as the reasons 
entailed by the belief that X is valuable. 
Some reasons are such that, if one has them, then, other things being equal (i.e., in 
the absence of overriding reasons to the contrary), one ought, rationally, to act on them.33 
The fact that arsenic will kill me, together with my desire to survive, give me a reason of 
this kind not to take arsenic: I ought, rationally, not to take arsenic. If I go ahead and take 
arsenic anyway, I am being irrational; I am violating a norm of rationality about what I 
ought to do. Let’s call these, following Jonathan Dancy, insistent reasons. Other reasons do 
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not have this force: they can justify an action that I might perform, without “insisting” that 
I ought to perform that action. The fact that it is sunny outside is a reason of this kind to 
take a walk.34 If I go for a walk, my action may be rationally justified (made intelligible) 
by the fact that it is sunny outside. However, if I see that it is sunny outside, and I know 
that this is a reason which would justify taking a walk, but I don’t take a walk, then, even 
in the absence of reasons not to take a walk, I am in no way irrational. Let’s call these 
justifying reasons. 
Now, there are cases in which the reasons involved in something’s being valuable 
are insistent reasons. For example, the fact that persons are valuable as such may mean, 
among other things, that there are insistent reasons not to kill them, not to manipulate 
them, to contribute to some extent to their happiness, etc. But not all cases are like this. 
Perhaps some of the reasons involved in the value of friendship are insistent – say, there 
are insistent reasons not to destroy other people’s friendships. But most of them are not; 
most of them are merely justifying reasons. If friendship is valuable, and I know it, it 
doesn’t mean that I ought, rationally, to make friends, to guide my life by the ideals of 
friendship, etc. If being a great piano player is valuable, and I know it, it doesn’t mean that 
I ought, rationally, to become a piano player, to strive to be the best piano player I can be, 
etc.  
But, unlike the person who merely believes that friendship or playing the piano is 
valuable, the person who values friendship, or being a piano player, does not see these 
reasons as merely justificatory; he sees them as insistent reasons. He doesn’t merely think 
that, if he chooses to be a good friend, his actions would be intelligible, or justified, in light 
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of the value of friendship; he thinks that he ought to be a good friend, he ought to pursue 
and maintain friendships, to encourage others to do so, etc. The fact that he sees himself as 
under this normative requirement cannot be explained by the content of his belief that 
friendship is valuable; that content says nothing about the fact that he ought to make 
friends, etc.  
Many cases of valuing involve objects considered to be valuable independently of 
one’s relationship to them. Thus one can value people, justice, art, a particular work of art, 
a particular person, chess, etc. And there are many ways is which one can value such 
things: one can respect a person, love her, admire her; one can have respect for art and 
artists, without having any particular interest in the arts; or one can enjoy practicing a 
certain art form as a hobby; or love it passionately, and devote one’s life to it. In many of 
these cases, one’s relationship to the valued object is clearly governed by norms that 
determine what the agent has reason to, may, or ought to do, think, or feel. For example, in 
respecting a person one ought not to deceive her, gossip about her, see her as a mere 
means, etc. One ought not to destroy works of art, and one has reasons to contribute to the 
advancement of the arts; etc. Arguably, in some of these cases the norms arise from the 
value of the object – the value of people, the value of works of art, and so on. If we see this 
value as independent of the agent’s attitudes towards the object, the agent is subject to 
these norms whether or not he values the object; he is subject to them simply in virtue of 
the objective value of the object.35 
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Not all cases of valuing are like this, however. There are many ways of valuing that 
are “optional,” i.e., not required of the agent in virtue of the value of the object. Any 
person ought to be respected by everyone, but not necessarily loved or admired; any art 
form ought to be respected, but one is under no obligation to enjoy or fully appreciate 
aesthetically the value of any particular art form; everyone ought to value justice in some 
sense, but the value of justice does not give rise to an obligation to make the promotion of 
justice one’s life goal – to become a lawyer or police officer, and devote one’s life to 
preventing injustice.36 
What is interesting is that, even though some ways of valuing are optional in this 
sense, they are similar to the non-optional forms of valuing in that they, as well, involve 
insistent reasons and norms the agent is subject to, and sees herself as subject to. But those 
norms are not (or not fully) grounded in the value of the object; if they were, then all 
agents would be subject to them, and that form of valuing would cease to be optional.37  
I will discuss in chapter 3 the nature and source of the norms the agent is, in fact, 
subject to when she values something. For now I will discuss the idea that valuing involves 
seeing oneself as subject to such norms. 
Suppose, for example, that I love Jane. She knows nothing about my love for her. 
She is not related to me, and we are not friends; I am under no obligation to love her. 
However, I do love her; you can imagine my love to be romantic in nature, or rather 
similar to the way one loves one’s friends.  
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Now, suppose that an opportunity arises, where I could do something for her sake - 
without intruding in her life, and without her knowing it. Let’s say, she is in great financial 
trouble, that might prevent her from going to college; and I could help her, without 
negative effects of any kind. 
Now if Jane were someone I didn’t know and had no feelings for, I may or may not 
want to help her. In any case, I would not feel obligated to help her. But because I love her, 
I will most likely want to help her, and I will feel that I ought to help her.38 
 Although love makes it very likely that I will want to help the person I love, it does 
not guarantee it. There are instances where we do not find ourselves very inclined to help 
the people we love, even when we think that we should; this sometimes happens when the 
person we love is our partner or friend, and it can equally happen when we have no 
particular relationship with that person.  
If I found myself unwilling to help Jane, and wanting to use the money instead for a 
nice vacation, I would find myself feeling ashamed. The reason for my shame would be the 
sense that, since I care about Jane, I ought to help her. We generally think that we ought to 
contribute to the well-being of the people we care about, and that we should want to do 
that for their own sake; that the well-being of the people we care about should be more 
important to us than trivial pleasures, and so on.  
We do not think, I believe, that we ought to contribute to the well-being of the 
people we love only when those people are our children, our spouses, our parents, or our 
friends. Loving someone – whether that someone is one’s spouse or someone who doesn’t 
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know us - consists, in part, in seeing oneself as having insistent reasons to promote her 
happiness, to help her when in need, etc.  
 If love didn’t involve insistent reasons, one would have no ground to feel ashamed 
about failing, in a particular instance, to want to contribute to the well-being of a beloved 
person one is in no relationship with. A failure to act on justifying reasons does not 
warrant, and does not give rise to, negative feelings such as shame and guilt, whereas a 
failure to act on conclusive insistent reasons may. 
Love is not the only form of valuing where one sees oneself as having insistent 
reasons. If I value teaching as my vocation, I will think that I ought to work hard to be an 
excellent teacher; and nothing but the fact that I value teaching in this way gives rise to this 
duty: it is not a duty specified in my job description, it is not required by the intrinsic value 
of teaching, and it does not come with the social role of being a teacher. If I value the china 
collection I inherited from my grandmother, I will feel that I ought to take good care of it, 
and not to sell it for $100 to buy a new dress.39  
 
 If it’s not the belief that X is valuable that unifies the (insistent) reasons one sees 
oneself as having when one values X, what is it? I believe that it is an attitude that we 
would call “seeing X as valuable.”40 We can understand this attitude by analogy with 
perceptual cases of seeing-as. When I see an object as a snake, my experience is different 
from when I see it as a hose. The visual experience itself may or may not be different, but 
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in any case the associations of ideas, emotional reactions, motivations, and actions I am 
likely to undergo or undertake will be very different. What accounts for this difference is a 
question for psychologists and philosophers of perception; but the phenomenon is a 
familiar one. One thing that seems clear is that, when I see the object as a snake, I 
categorize it in a different way than when I see it as a hose; and this different way of 
categorizing it results in different associations of ideas, emotional reactions, etc.  
 Seeing as is different from belief, although there are strong psychological 
connections between the two. I can see an object as a snake without yet believing that it is 
a snake. A moment later, if the object is in fact a snake, I will likely also form the belief 
that it is a snake. If it’s a hose, then I will likely form the belief it’s a hose. Typically, as a 
result in this latter case I will also stop seeing it as a snake, and start seeing it as a hose; but 
not necessarily. Sometimes a certain way of experiencing an object can coexist with the 
belief that it is not the kind of object that warrants that experience. This may not be typical 
in snake–hose scenarios (although, even in such cases, at least some of the reactions 
characteristic of seeing the object as a snake can linger even after I become fully convinced 
it’s just a hose – I may still be reluctant to touch it, walk around it, etc.) But it is common 
in other cases. One can be fully aware that the moving object behind one is one’s own 
shadow, but still see it as a threatening stranger, and fear it. A war veteran on July 4th can 
know for sure that the loud noise he is about to hear is a firework, and still hear it as a 
grenade explosion.41 
 The same phenomenon can occur (in fact, is even more prevalent) with non-
perceptual ways of parsing the world. Even though the zoo-keeper assures you that this 
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particular snake species is harmless as a doll, and you fully believe him, you may still see 
the snake as dangerous, and fear it, and avoid it. An anxious person may know that it’s 
very unlikely that he would embarrass himself, and that the audience is not there to judge 
him, but still perceive the situation as having a high potential for embarrassment, and feel 
or act awkward, or avoid it. Conversely, an over-confident person might know from past 
experience that he is not a great entertainer, and believe that he will likely embarrass 
himself again tonight, but still see the party as the perfect opportunity to shine, and himself 
as a rising star.  
 The concepts involved in these cases are evaluative: dangerous, potentially 
embarrassing, the opportunity to shine. They categorize an object or a situation partly in 
terms of how to feel and/or act. In the cases I described, the agent feels and acts 
accordingly.42 The same phenomenon of seeing-as is also possible with respect to value 
concepts. Now, one difference between what I call here evaluative concepts and value 
concepts is that, besides their descriptive component, evaluative concepts only parse the 
world in terms of how to feel and/or act, whereas value concepts also parse the world in 
terms of what one has reasons to do.43  
 I can see teaching philosophy as a job, as a career, as a way of making a difference 
in the world, as a vocation, and so on. When I see teaching philosophy as a job, I see it as 
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the kind of thing one has a reason to practice to pay the bills. If my friends ask me why I 
teach philosophy, I may answer: “Well, it’s a job.” I also see it as the kind of thing I ought 
to do reasonably well, where “reasonably well” is defined largely in terms of my job 
description. To my highly motivated colleagues who work late hours, I say: “It’s just a 
job!” When I see teaching philosophy as a vocation, I see it as the kind of thing I have to 
pursue: I see its potential to open up and nurture the minds of young people, the ability to 
share knowledge, the joy and excitement of the dialogue it makes possible as calling me to 
be a philosophy teacher. I see teaching philosophy as the kind of thing I want and ought to 
do to the best of my abilities. If my friends ask me why, I can just give them the list: the 
potential to open up and nurture the minds of young people, etc.  
  
 An interesting difference between believing that X is Y and seeing X as Y is that 
one has a choice about how to see X that one does not have about what to believe about X. 
You can see the duck- rabbit either as a duck, or as a rabbit; and you can choose to see it 
one way or another. (You can implement the choice by focusing on some aspects of the 
drawing rather than others). But if you believe that the drawing represents at the same time 
a duck and a rabbit, you cannot choose to believe that it is only a duck, or that it is only a 
rabbit. If you believe a certain object is a work of art, you cannot choose not to believe that 
it is a work of art. But you can choose to see it as a work of art, or to see it merely as, say, 
a urinal (when the object you are looking at is Duchamp’s Fountain.) 
 Now, one difference between believing and seeing as is that it is psychologically 
possible for you (within limits set by the nature of the object, and by your imaginative 
resources) to choose how to see an object, whereas it is often psychologically impossible, 
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and in most cases very difficult, to choose what to believe. But this is not the main 
difference I am interested in. There is a further sense in which you can choose how to see 
an object, whereas you cannot choose what to believe. If you believe that p, and that your 
belief is justified, then you cannot rationally choose to believe that not p. But “seeing as” 
is not subject to the same constraints. If I believe that Duchamp’s fountain is a work of art, 
and that my belief is justified, then it would be irrational to try to believe that it is a mere 
urinal, and not a work of art. But there is nothing irrational, other things being equal, about 
choosing to see it as a urinal, and not as an art object. That is, there are no rational 
standards governing “seeing as” that would forbid adopting one stance rather than another. 
 Are there any rational standards that govern seeing as? Suppose that I see 
Duchamp’s Fountain as a helicopter. Now, if I’m seeing it as a helicopter because I’m 
hallucinating, there is definitely something wrong with me as a perceiver. My perceptual 
system is not fulfilling its function properly. But is the failure one of rationality? If I am 
hallucinating as a result of high fever, we won’t say it’s a failure of rationality. Now 
suppose I see Fountain as a helicopter because I think that there is a huge conspiracy 
against me, and everywhere I look there are people in helicopters spying on me or trying to 
kidnap me; or I believe that the first principle of the universe is a helicopter, and this belief 
puts me into a constant hallucinative state, where I see everything as a helicopter. In cases 
like these, the beliefs that lead me to see all objects as helicopters are irrational, but it is not 
clear whether seeing the objects as helicopters is itself irrational. 
 In any case, not all instances in which I see something as something it is not, e.g. 
Fountain as a helicopter, involve a failure in perception or in rationality. Suppose that I 
just love helicopters, and I’d be really happy if I could live in a world populated by them. I 
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also happen to have a very powerful imagination, and I am capable of actually seeing many 
of the things around me as helicopters. That is, I am almost always capable of seeing the 
strong similarities between a given, random object, and a helicopter; I am capable of 
focusing on those similarities to the extent that everything else about the object disappears 
in a distant background, and all my reactions to the object are shaped by my perception of 
and focus on those similarities: the associations I make, the emotions I experience, the 
thoughts I have, etc. I am not hallucinating, and I am not deluded: I am perfectly aware of 
the fact that the object in front of me is not a helicopter; nevertheless, I see it as one. I 
don’t think any irrationality is involved in a case like this. It is a strange case, and it’s not 
likely that many people feel this way about helicopters, or want to experience the world in 
this way. But it is not psychologically impossible; neither is it irrational. And there are 
many, more familiar, cases that have nothing to do with helicopters, but where a similar 
phenomenon is involved. A person who believes in God might see every object as God’s 
creation, and everything that happens as an expression of God’s will, wisdom, and 
benevolence; a person in love might see love everywhere; the main character played by 
Bjork in the movie “Dancer in the dark” is slowly going blind, and she hears the noise of 
the machines in the dreary factory she works in as music. There doesn’t seem to be 
anything irrational in these cases. 
 The things that are valuable are at the same time both valuable and things. A person 
is at the same time a person, an organism, a lump of cells. If one believes that A is a 
person, one cannot simply choose not to believe it. But one can choose not to see A as a 
person – to see A merely as an organism, or merely as a lump of cells. 44 
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 There may be cases in which a particular individual cannot see an object in a certain way. Someone might 
be so much in the grip of seeing people as people, that he cannot bring himself to see them merely as lumps 
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 The fact that the way one sees an object is subject to choice opens up the possibility 
of a commitment to see an object in a certain way. I believe that valuing an object can best 
be understood as a commitment to see that object as valuable in a certain way.45 I will 
argue that understanding valuing as a commitment of this kind can best explain the role 
valuing plays in our agency and, more generally, in our lives.  
 It would be possible, in principle, to see teaching philosophy as a vocation today, as 
a mere job tomorrow, and as a career the day after tomorrow. In fact, I think there are 
people who have difficulties adopting one single perspective, just as there are people who 
have difficulties settling down. When I value teaching as a vocation, I do not merely see it 
as a vocation; I am also committed to seeing it as such. It is possible to see people as 
people most of the time, but then, when I need cash, to see them merely as cash-bearing 
bodies; to see women as persons most of the time, but as mere sex-objects when aroused; 
to see animals as sentient beings some of the time, but as potential good steaks at other 
times. Someone who values women and, generally, people as people is committed to 
always seeing them as people46; and one who values animals as sentient beings is 
committed to always seeing them as such. 
 Now, someone could, as a matter of fact, always see people as people, or animals 
as sentient beings, without being committed to this way of seeing them. The stability over 
time of his way of seeing animals could be that of habit, of lack of imagination, or of some 
general rigidity in the way he sees things. Saying that when a person values something, he 
                                                                                                                                                    
of cells. Or someone might lack the imaginative resources needed to see everything as a helicopter. But this 
does not mean that the way one sees an object is not the object of choice. Not everyone can run a marathon, 
but this does not mean that running a marathon cannot be the object of choice.  
45
 More about the qualifier “in a certain way” later.  
46
 This is not incompatible with sometimes seeing people also as sex objects, but it is incompatible with 
seeing them merely as sex objects. 
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is committed to seeing it as valuable in a certain way means that this way of seeing the 
object has a special place in the person’s agency. The agent doesn’t take it as a mere 
occurrence in his mental life – the way he might take some desires, urges, or feelings. He 
in some sense identifies with this way of seeing the object, sees it as part of who he is as an 
agent, as his way of seeing, and as such takes it to have a special authority in his agency.47  
 The difference between merely seeing an object as valuable, and being committed 
to seeing it as such can best be seen in cases where a person finds herself with a way of 
seeing something, and experiences it as alien. Think of the woman who grew up in a sexist 
environment and as a result sees men as more valuable than women – as the kind of beings 
she ought to defer to, obey, serve, as the kind of beings who are worth deferring to, 
obeying, and serving. In her adult life, she has come to believe that this way of seeing men 
is unjustified; however, she still finds herself in its grip, and will be struggling for years to 
outgrow it. She cannot help seeing men in this way: whenever a man demands something 
of her, she automatically takes it as a reason to obey. It takes constant effort and a lot of 
self-reflection on her part to bring her tendency to see such facts as reasons into conscious 
awareness, oppose to it her beliefs about what should really count as a reason, and resist it.  
 In this case, our woman’s stance towards her way of seeing men is similar to that of 
the mother in Watson’s example towards her urge to drown her crying baby. She 
experiences it as alien. Her predicament is more serious than the mother’s, because the 
attitude she finds alien is not a fleeting urge; it affects the core of her agency, in that it 
                                                 
47
 The commitment involved in valuing is not necessarily – and not typically – the result of a decision to 
make a commitment. We often find ourselves committed to people, causes, careers, without having at some 
point in time made a decision to commit. The commitment of valuing is thus different from the commitment 
that arises from making a promise or saying “I do”.  
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affects what she habitually takes as reasons for action. She thus sees men as more valuable 
than women, but she doesn’t value them as such. This is not because she doesn’t believe 
them to be more valuable (although it is true of her that she doesn’t), but because she 
doesn’t take her way of seeing men to have authority as her way of seeing. She 
experiences her way of seeing men as the relic of her unfortunate upbringing, and is not in 
the least committed to it; on the contrary, she is committed to eradicating it.  
 This suggests that one aspect of the commitment involved in valuing is that the 
agent takes her seeing the object as valuable to have authority in her deliberations by virtue 
of representing her point of view. This is one way in which valuing differs from desires: a 
mere desire does not have the authority of expressing the agent’s point of view. The 
example of the sexist woman shows that the mere fact that one sees an object in a certain 
way does not give that way of seeing the authority of expressing the agent’s point of view 
either. In order for a desire, or a way of seeing, to have that authority, it is necessary that 
the agent take that desire or way of seeing to have that authority when he thinks, 
deliberates, and acts.  
 The fact that the agent takes his seeing an object as valuable to have authority in his 
agency amounts to the following: when he deliberates explicitly, he gives weight as 
reasons to the things that he sees as reasons by virtue of seeing the object as valuable; he 
feels guilty or ashamed, and takes himself to have reasons for so feeling, if he does not act 
in accordance with those reasons; he sees severe violations of what he values as self-
betrayal; he feels pride and self-fulfillment, and takes himself to have reasons for so 
feeling, if he does live up to the standards implicit in his valuing; he experiences the 
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obligations arising from those norms as coming from within, and not as imposed from the 
outside. 
 Understanding valuing as a kind of commitment fits well with common sense 
observations about valuing. It explains the stability characteristic of valuing, and how it 
differs from that of persistent desires. As mentioned earlier, our intuition is that the 
stability over time of valuing is not contingent, like that of persistent desires; it flows from 
the nature of valuing. It doesn’t make sense to say that I value teaching for five minutes. 
The view that valuing is a form of commitment explains why. It makes no sense to be 
committed to teaching only for 5 minutes (what would that commitment amount to?) 
Moreover, the view clarifies one reason why there is something defective about valuing 
teaching today, not valuing it tomorrow, and valuing it again in three days: a wavering 
commitment like this is not much of a commitment at all – it defeats the purpose of a 
commitment.  
  
 I have suggested, in this chapter, that valuing involves a commitment to seeing the 
valued object as valuable. In the following chapters I will further develop this model of 
valuing and defend it by showing that it helps us to better understand the nature and value 
of love (chapter 2), the source of some special “oughts” (chapter 3), and how valuing 
contributes to meaningfulness in life (chapter 4).  
  
Chapter 2: Love 
 
 I. What’s at stake 
 One hears everywhere how important love and love relationships are for a good, 
fulfilling life; how no life can be meaningful without love of some kind; how crucial love 
is for the psychological well-being of both the one who loves, and the one who is loved. If 
one can get over their platitudinous ring, these assertions seem true and important. What 
one doesn’t hear often enough, however, are convincing explanations of why, and how, 
love contributes to a good, meaningful, healthy life; what is it about love that makes it so 
important to us, that enables it to play its role in our lives.  
 The many and diverse attempts made by philosophers, novelists, poets, or film-
makers to define love seem driven at least in part by the need for an explanation of the 
value of love. Some argue that love is essentially a stable desire for the well-being of the 
beloved48; some that it is an extension of one’s self to include the self of another49; others 
that it is an emotion,50 or an emotion complex;51 some that it is a complex emotion defined 
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 Harry Frankfurt, The Reasons of love; Hugh LaFollette, Personal relationships: Love, Identity, and 
morality; Richard John White, Love’s philosophy. 
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 Robert Solomon, About love: reinventing romance for our times; Robert Nozick, “Love’s bond,” in The 
examined life: Philosophical meditations.  
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 D.W. Hamlyn, “The phenomena of love and hate,” in Alan Soble (ed.), Eros, Agape, and Philia.  
51
 Anette Baier, “Unsafe loves,” in R.C. Solomon & K.M. Higgins (eds.), The philosophy of (erotic) love; 
Neera Kapur Badhwar, “Love,” in Hugh LaFollette (ed.), Practical Ethics. 
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by a socially constructed script for interpreting one’s more basic emotions;52 others that it 
is a sui-generis way of valuing a person53, or a relationship.54  
 Many philosophers who develop such conceptions of love offer them as competing 
accounts of the true nature of love. They argue that love is essentially a desire for the well-
being of the beloved, rather than an emotion; or that it is a way of valuing, rather than a 
conative attitude; and so on. It is not always entirely clear what the disagreement is about. 
Often, the dispute seems merely verbal; and when one looks at the diversity of things we 
talk about using the word “love,” it looks like the concept is flexible enough to 
accommodate all the conceptions that have been proposed. 
 One way to understand the debate between philosophers who develop different 
conceptions of love is as about the nature of the attitudes, emotions, or relationships we are 
capable of. This seems, for example, a plausible way of understanding the dispute between 
those who argue that love is a natural emotion and those who believe it is socially 
constructed. It is also plausible, to take another example, that those who believe that love is 
a conative attitude resist the idea that love is a sui-generis way of valuing a person because 
they believe that there is no such attitude as that of valuing a person (in a way recognizable 
as love) that is not, in the end, reducible to some conative attitude(s).  
 Other times, disagreements about the nature of love are more plausibly and 
fruitfully understood as disagreements about value. Someone who believes that love is a 
sui-generis way of valuing can easily accept that we are capable of conative attitudes such 
as desiring the well-being of the beloved. What he wants to persuade us of is that such a 
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conative attitude is not “real love,” not what love really is about. Here, the disagreement is 
not so much about what kind of attitudes we are capable of; rather, it is a disagreement 
about the kind of attitude that deserves to be called, or ought to be called, “love.” The 
concept of love is value-laden in several different ways: we believe that love is a valuable 
(perhaps necessary) part of a good, meaningful life; that it is morally admirable; that some 
people ought to love certain others (one’s children, perhaps one’s spouse, parents, old 
intimate friends in the absence of reasons to the contrary); at least some believe that love 
creates special responsibilities towards the people one loves.55 To make a judgment about 
what should count as love is to take a stance on these value issues. Disagreements about 
the nature of love are often disagreements about what makes love valuable, about what 
kind of attitude is most worth striving for in our lives, and / or about how we ought to treat 
certain others and why.  
 My aim in this chapter is to explore the thought that love is a way of valuing a 
person, and the perspective this way of understanding love gives us on some of the value 
questions surrounding love. I am interested in seeing what it is that we say about love 
when we say that it is a way of valuing; which features of love are brought to light by 
understanding it as valuing, and whether highlighting those features helps us to gain some 
insight into what makes love valuable, into the role love plays in our lives, and, potentially, 
the role it plays in our moral lives.  
                                                 
55
 It would be interesting to explore how these different normative dimensions of love are related to one 
another: whether perhaps love is morally admirable because it is a crucial part of a meaningful life; or it is 
part of a good life because it is morally admirable (this seems very implausible to me, by the way); or what 
makes it morally admirable is what also makes it capable of providing meaning in life; whether the grounds 
or justification for the responsibilities of love are to be found in love’s role in a good life. I will not be able to 
address thoroughly all these questions, but the discussion to come will bear on some of them.  
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 I will start by describing some of the puzzles that arise in thinking about value 
questions about love. I will then argue that a conative analysis of love fares poorly at 
explaining the characteristic value of love, and will show that these puzzles can be solved 
by understanding love on the model of valuing proposed in chapter 1. 
 II. The puzzles 
 
  One of the most intriguing commonplaces about love is that love can give meaning 
to one’s life. Explaining what that means is a difficult philosophical project on its own, 
which deserves separate treatment. But even if we only have a pre-theoretical 
understanding of meaningfulness in life, the thought that love can give meaning to one’s 
life seems a central part of our intuitive conception of love’s distinctive value. We don’t 
say, for example, that liking another person or being sexually attracted to her can make 
one’s life meaningful, or that desiring someone’s company, or even desiring to benefit her, 
can make life meaningful. These other attitudes and relationships are valuable to us, but 
they do not have the same particular kind of value that we think love has. I believe that a 
good account of the characteristic value of love, of the role it can play in our lives, would 
have to accommodate, and perhaps shed some light on, the assertion that love can provide 
a life with meaning. 
 
 Here are some other differences between the kind of value and normative 
significance we attribute to love and to other attitudes. Consider, for example, Bernard 
Williams’ “one thought too many” scenario. A man can either save his wife from 
drowning, or a stranger, but not both. It would be absurd to require the man to be impartial 
 42 
between the stranger and his wife. Moreover, points out Williams, there would be 
something wrong with a man who decided to save his wife because it was morally right to 
do so – whose motivating reason for saving his wife was, say, that special treatment of 
one’s intimates maximizes utility. Our man should decide to save his wife simply because 
she is his wife, and not because she is his wife, and it’s morally right to favor one’s wife. 
 On my favorite interpretation of the case, what is essential here is not the fact that 
she is his wife, but the fact that he loves her. We think that his reason for saving her should 
be that he loves her, and not that morality says it is right to give priority to the people you 
love. Entertaining a thought like: “I will save her if doing so maximizes the greater good” 
seems incompatible with genuine love. We would doubt the depth or authenticity of the 
love of a husband who reasoned this way. And at least some of us would be reluctant to 
find him morally admirable: even though he is thoroughly committed to following the 
requirements of morality, his failure in loving strikes us as a moral failure.56 
 But consider our reactions to a scenario in which the man has to choose between a 
stranger and a woman he is very much sexually attracted to; or between a stranger and a 
person he likes very much and hopes to some day be friends with. Some would probably 
say that it would not be okay to favor one person because he is attracted to her, or likes her. 
Others might say that it would be okay to save the person he likes very much rather than 
the stranger. In any case, in such situations, the agent’s pondering about whether it would 
be morally okay to save the person he likes would hardly strike anyone as “one thought too 
many.” The apparent incompatibility between loving someone, on the one hand, and seeing 
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him as doing well or failing in his love for her. More on this, and on why this failure might be moral, in 
chapter 3. 
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the saving of her life as contingent on the requirements of morality, on the other hand, is 
not present in cases of mere liking, or of desires to be with, be in a sexual relationship 
with, etc. This is a difference in normative significance that needs to be explained.  
  
 Consider one further difference. Al loves his friend Ben. When Al meets Cecil, 
who appears to have all the qualities Al loves about Ben, plus a few extras, Al stops loving 
Ben, and starts to love Cecil. Then one day Al meets Dan, who seems even cooler than 
Cecil, and he stops loving Cecil, and starts loving Dan instead. If asked what they think 
about Al, the first thing people would probably criticize him for is his lack of loyalty 
towards his friends. But even if we set aside moral issues about what Al owes to his 
friends, and focus on the attitudes, emotions and relationships Al seems capable of, and the 
contributions they make to his life, we would be inclined to say that they are far from ideal. 
Al doesn’t really love his friends, we’ll say. When you really love someone, the person 
you love is not replaceable to you in the manner Al’s friends seem to be replaceable to 
him. And we believe that the irreplaceability of the person(s) you love is a valuable 
characteristic of love. 
 There are two main questions raised by the idea that the beloved is irreplaceable to 
the lover: How is this irreplaceability even possible? And why is it valuable? 
 The very possibility of the irreplaceability of the beloved poses a problem because 
it seems incompatible with another deeply held belief about love. We commonly think that 
we love people for their personal qualities: for being kind, warm, sensitive, smart, quirky. 
But, the worry goes, if personal qualities are one’s reasons for love, then the beloved is in 
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fact replaceable by any other person with the same qualities. How can we make sense of 
this? 
 It is easy to see one reason why irreplaceability is valuable from the perspective of 
the beloved: whatever advantages there are to being loved by someone will be diminished 
by the prospect of being replaced whenever someone better comes along. But we also 
believe that the person who loves benefits himself from this characteristic of love. We are 
inclined to pity Al for not being capable of entertaining genuine love. It is less obvious 
why irreplaceability is valuable for the person who loves. After all, why isn’t it better to 
have attachments that are easily transferable to other people, when other people have even 
more loveable qualities? We seem to think that it’s not better; that even if you could get 
everyone else to love you as irreplaceable, without reciprocating, you wouldn’t be better 
off; in fact, you would be worse off; but it’s not obvious why.  
   
 III. Love as a conative attitude  
  
 If asked to define love, a first thing people will say is that if you love someone, you 
want her happiness. Indifference to the fate of your beloved, no inclination to contribute to 
her well-being, unwillingness to make sacrifices for her sake are commonly thought to be 
incompatible with love; they are the best proof that what you may feel is not love. Given 
the centrality to our conception of love of the presence of a stable, solid desire to promote 
the well-being of the person one loves, it is tempting to conclude that this is what love is: 
that to love somebody just is to have a (perhaps particular kind of) desire for her well-
being.  
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 Harry Frankfurt defends a conception of love along these lines. Love is, he argues, 
a “disinterested concern for the well-being or flourishing of the beloved object.”57 The key 
lies in the meaning of “disinterested.” 
 The kind of concern for a person’s well-being most clearly contrary to love is 
concern for an ulterior motive: if I want my aunt’s well-being because if she dies before 70 
I will not inherit her fortune, my concern is by no means that of love. Even when one’s 
ulterior motive is not that selfish or reckless, concern for a person’s well-being does not 
amount to love: if I want my aunt’s well-being because she is about to find a cure for 
cancer, I do not necessarily love my aunt.  
 What if my concern for her well-being has no ulterior motive whatsoever – if I 
simply want her to be well, for no further reasons? This pure concern seems close to what 
we have in mind when we say that to really love someone is to care about her well-being 
for her own sake: not for the sake of her money, not for the sake of the good she can do for 
the world, but for her own sake. It is this kind of concern for someone’s well-being, 
concern based on no ulterior motives, that Harry Frankfurt calls “disinterested concern” 
and with which he identifies love. 
 As it stands, the analysis of love as disinterested concern for the beloved’s well-
being fails to distinguish love from benevolence or charity. One can be disinterestedly 
concerned about the well-being of children who starve in third-world countries, without 
thereby loving them. Frankfurt is aware of this difficulty, and suggests the following 
solution: what distinguishes love from benevolence is its personal character. In the case of 
charity, he says, the particular identity of the people whose well-being I am concerned with 
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 Harry Frankfurt, “On caring,” p. 167. Frankfurt intends this definition to apply to love of persons as well as 
any other type of love: love for a pet, for one’s country, etc. My primary interest here is in love for persons. 
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is not relevant to my concern. What qualifies them to be the object of my concern “is not 
their specificity as particular individuals, but their membership in a class”58 - the fact that 
they are children who live in conditions of extreme poverty.  
 “With regard to what we love, on the other hand, that sort of indifference to the 
identity of the object of concern is out of the question. Substituting some other object for 
the beloved is not an acceptable and perhaps not even an intelligible option. The 
significance to the lover of what he loves is not that of an exemplar; its importance to him 
is not generic, but ineluctably particular.”59 
 This qualification seems to be a step in the right direction, but is still insufficient. It 
is not clear that benevolence is always indifferent to the identity of its target, as Frankfurt 
suggests. Imagine that I receive in the mail a letter presenting the heart-wrenching story 
and photos of a little girl Sonya. I am touched by the story and, from that day on, out of a 
stable concern for her well-being, I send $20 every month to “Help a Child,” a charity 
organization that promises to use my money for food, medical and education expenses for 
Sonya. My concern in this case is personal: I was moved by Sonya’s story, and care about 
her well-being, and although I may also contribute $50 to a different charity, say Oxfam, 
that helps whoever it deems to be most in need, I want my monthly $20 to go to Sonya, 
and not to someone else. I need not love Sonya, however, in order for this to be true; my 
attitude towards her is still one of benevolence rather than love, even though it is not 
transferable to some other helpless child. 
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 The identity of the beloved does play an essential role in love, but the mere fact that 
it does is not distinctive of love. To understand what is specific to love and its 
characteristic value, we need to know more about the particular nature of the role played 
by the identity of the beloved. 
 Frankfurt argues that the irreplaceability of the beloved is simply a consequence of 
the fact that the object of love is a particular individual. Suppose I love Frank, who is kind, 
honest, blond, smart, etc. – where “etc.” includes all of Frank’s qualities. The object of my 
love is not whoever satisfies the description “kind, honest, blond, smart, etc.”; it is this 
particular individual, Frank. Love is a de re attitude. This is why, says Frankfurt, if another 
person were instantly created with the same qualities, my love would not be transferable to 
him.60  
 If that were all there was to the non-transferability of love, then it wouldn’t be 
distinctive of love, and its presumed value would be a mystery. After all, any fixation on a 
particular is non-transferable in the same way. For instance, even though one’s libido is 
typically indifferent to the identity of its object, a particular individual can become the 
fixed object of one’s sexual desire. When this happens, that desire cannot be satisfied by 
any other object, however similar, but only by the individual it got stuck on. We don’t 
think there is anything especially valuable about this kind of irreplaceability.61 But we do 
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replaced her, she is; and there is a grey area somewhere in between. If Kraut is right that the de re character 
of love is to be explained in terms of the irreplaceability of the beloved, then one can’t explain 
irreplaceability by appealing to love’s de re character, as Frankfurt wants. 
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 This doesn’t mean there’s anything wrong with it, only that it doesn’t have that special kind of value. 
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think that there is something intrinsically good, something admirable and desirable, about 
the kind of irreplaceability characteristic of love. If someone desired your well-being as a 
result of a fixation of some sort, you might welcome the concern, but it will not mean as 
much to you as love. One of the things we appreciate about love is that, when someone 
loves you, your identity is essential for that love – not merely in the sense that you, and not 
someone else, happen to be the fixed object of that love, but also because that love is 
somehow grounded in who you are. What we need is an account that makes sense of and 
clarifies this vague intuition. 
 The thought that love is a way of valuing an individual seems promising in this 
direction. If love is a response to the value of the beloved, then the beloved plays a more 
significant role than the chance object of a fixation. It is his value that the lover responds 
to. The challenge is to clarify and flesh out the thought that love is a way of valuing: what 
exactly are we saying about love, when we say it is a way of valuing an individual, and 
how can this help us to understand the value of love? 
 David Velleman has defended a very suggestive and provocative conception of 
love as valuing. I believe that ultimately his account is unsatisfactory, but his analysis of 
love contains many important insights, and is a great starting point for uncovering the 
possibilities of understanding love as a form of valuing. So we will turn to it next. 
 
  IV. Love as valuing a person as a person 
 Velleman argues that love is a particular way of appreciating the value of a person 
as a person. In this respect, love is similar to respect. However, love differs from respect in 
being a different form of appreciation. When we respect someone, we appreciate his value 
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as a person in a way that checks our self-love: our awareness of his personhood acts as a 
chaperone to our self-interested motives, and allows us to act only in ways that are 
compatible with his value as a person. But sometimes we come to appreciate a person’s 
value differently: we become aware of the value of his personhood in a way that, as 
Velleman puts it, “arrests our tendencies toward emotional self-protection from the other 
person, tendencies to draw ourselves in and close ourselves off from being affected by him. 
Love disarms our emotional defenses; it makes us vulnerable to the other. (…) the various 
motives that are often identified with love are in fact independent responses that love 
merely unleashes. They are the sympathy, empathy, fascination, and attraction that we feel 
for another person when our emotional defenses toward him have been disarmed. (…) in 
suspending our emotional defenses, love exposes our sympathy to the needs of the other, 
and we are therefore quick to respond when help is needed.”62 
 On Velleman’s view, personal qualities such as intelligence, wit and the like are not 
justifying reasons for loving their possessor. It is the person’s value as such that is the 
reason for loving him, and in this sense all people are equally worthy of one’s love. We 
only love some and not others, explains Velleman, because our emotional resources are 
limited, and we cannot be emotionally open and vulnerable to everyone. Although a 
person’s qualities do not justify one’s loving her rather than someone else, they explain, 
causally, why one loves her and not someone else. Personal qualities are the gate to one’s 
personhood; they are concrete manifestations of one’s personhood, and as such they are 
ways into appreciating it. But there are differences between people in what they are 
receptive to. For some of us, a person’s intelligence is what gets to us, what makes us 
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sensitive to and receptive to his personhood and his value as a person; for others, it is a 
person’s peculiar sense of humor that leads to an emotional openness to and appreciation 
of the value of her personhood; for others, it’s beauty; and so on. This is why a person’s 
qualities can explain how we come to love some people rather than others. 
 I believe this view is appealing because it fits with and promises to make sense of 
our sense that love goes beyond a person’s qualities, that it is a response to something 
deeper to the person. It also seems promising in explaining the value of love: love is not 
merely a fixation; it is an appreciation of the value of the person, an appreciation that 
engages the lover’s emotional being and thus results, typically, in a stable desire for the 
well-being of the beloved. The desire for her well-being is rooted in the beloved’s value.63 
 In spite of these promising qualities, Velleman’s view seems implausible as an 
account of love. As many have pointed out, it is implausible that love consists in an 
appreciation of the value of a person as a person. The view conflicts with the common 
belief that we love a person for his personal qualities. We love people because they are 
kind, generous, beautiful, intelligent, sensitive, and the like, and we believe that such 
qualities are good reasons for love. If your best friend or spouse asks you: “why do you 
love me?” and you answer: “because you are a person,” you’re in trouble. There is a kind 
of love that is grounded on the value of a person as a person – but that is a love that one 
can feel for all people, or for humanity in general. That kind of love has emotional 
components that are interestingly different from respect, but it is not the love that forms the 
basis of close relationships. However, it is the latter that philosophers writing on love, 
including Velleman, are trying to define.  
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 Velleman argues – and this is the target of his paper - that these features of love explain love’s value as a 
moral emotion, but this is not our main concern here.  
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 A defender of Velleman’s view might argue that common sense fails to distinguish 
between explanatory reasons and grounding reasons for love. The claim that personal 
qualities are good reasons for love is true, but only if interpreted as the claim that they are 
good explanatory reasons. If one insisted that the common sense view is that positive 
personal qualities can ground love, he might say that, in that case, common sense is wrong, 
and that in any case we wouldn’t want to accept the consequences of the claim that 
personal qualities are grounding reasons for love. First, he might say, the claim implies that 
the beloved is replaceable by someone with the same qualities. So someone who criticizes 
Velleman on the grounds that his view is incompatible with the intuition that personal 
qualities are grounding reasons for love has the burden of showing that this intuition does 
not conflict with irreplaceability. I will take up this challenge later in the chapter. 
Secondly, Velleman’s defender might argue that the intuition conflicts with another 
intuition of common sense: that even a person who lacks any appealing qualities deserves 
to and can be loved in the context of a personal relationship. The frog only needs to be 
kissed to turn into a prince. But notice that the frog in the story really is a prince, and 
eventually returns to being one. We wouldn’t be very satisfied if the frog actually turned 
out to be only that, a frog, and the princess stayed married to a frog her whole life; or if the 
frog transformed into an unattractive, stupid, annoying, boring, humorless person, with no 
positive qualities whatsoever.  
 To the claim that the love grounded in a person’s value as a person is a love one 
can feel for all people, and not the love of personal relationships, Velleman’s defender 
might object that both kinds of love can be grounded in the same value. The difference 
between them need not be a difference in the value they respond to; it is a difference in the 
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way one responds to that value. Now, it is true that one can respond in different ways to the 
same value; but the problem is that, whereas humanitarian love makes sense as a response 
to the value of people as people, the love of personal relationships doesn’t. Here is one 
reason why it doesn’t make sense: the irreplaceability of the beloved characteristic of 
personal relationships is at odds with the claim that one’s love for him is based on his 
value as a person. 
 Velleman’s view is that the irreplaceability of the beloved is not a consequence of 
the fact that the value we see in her, and love her for, is unique to her. Rather, 
irreplaceability is a consequence of the kind of valuing warranted by her value as a person. 
Velleman makes use here of the Kantian distinction between dignity and price. People 
have a special kind of value, dignity, that differs from price in that it does not warrant 
comparisons or replacements. Since love is, on Velleman’s view, an appreciation of a 
person’s dignity, it is incompatible with regarding the person as replaceable.  
  I find this account unsatisfying because it does not seem to explain the 
irreplaceability characteristic of love. If one’s beloved is irreplaceable because his dignity 
does not warrant replacements, then he is irreplaceable in the exact same way in which any 
other person is irreplaceable. But this is not what we mean when we say that the beloved is 
irreplaceable. What we mean is that it is unintelligible to transfer one’s love for a person to 
some other person. It is not clear, however, why someone’s value as a person would make 
this kind of transfer unintelligible. After all, one’s dignity is not incompatible with all 
types of replacements; it is not incompatible, for example, with replacing an employee 
with a better one, if the first one is given proper notice. Velleman’s account is in need of an 
explanation for why dignity is incompatible with being replaced in love. Besides, we 
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believe that one’s beloved is irreplaceable in a special way – in a way different from that in 
which any person is irreplaceable.  
 
 V. An alternative account of love as valuing 
 When we value an object, I argued, we see that object as valuable in a certain way. 
Seeing the object as valuable involves at the same time taking some facts about it to be 
reasons for certain kinds of actions, beliefs, conations, and emotions, and being motivated 
to perform those actions and experience the beliefs, conations, emotions. The particular 
way in which we value something depends on what we see as reasons, and the set of 
actions etc. they are seen as reasons for. Often, if not always, the reasons we see and the 
motives we have are structured by the concept under which we value the object. 
 When we respect someone, for example, we see her as valuable as a person. The 
concept of a person is value-laden; seeing someone as a person is not reducible to seeing 
her as, say, a member of the species homo sapiens. It involves seeing her as someone to be 
treated in certain ways, and at the same time being motivated, to some extent, to treat her 
in those ways. What features are constitutive of personhood, and what kinds of treatments 
are characteristic of respect are open questions. If a Kantian answer is right, seeing 
someone as a person amounts to seeing her capacity for rationality as requiring treatments 
that do not interfere with, and to some extent support, the exercise of her capacity. 
Respecting someone involves, then, seeing her capacity for rationality as a reason not to 
coerce her, not to deceive her, not to kill her, to sometimes help her when in need, etc., and 
being motivated to act in these ways.  
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 Similarly, loving someone involves seeing her as valuable in a certain way – that is, 
seeing certain facts about her as giving one reasons for the feelings, attitudes, thoughts, 
motivations, and actions characteristic of love. In order to specify the form of valuing 
characteristic of love, we need to say what are the facts about the beloved that one sees as 
reasons, and what are the feelings, attitudes, actions one sees reasons for. A lot has been 
written on the latter, and I will not say much about it, though I will come back to this later. 
As for the facts about the beloved one sees as reasons, I have argued that they are not the 
facts that form one’s personhood. What are they then? 
 I suggest that we take literally the common thought that when you love someone, 
you love her for who she is. When you love someone, you see her as valuable by virtue of 
being who she is: you see some facts about her as contributing to who she is, and you take 
them to be reasons for your feelings of love, for your desire for her happiness, for 
contributing to her happiness – for the attitudes, feelings, thoughts, motivations and actions 
characteristic of love.  
 In order to value someone for who she is, you need not have a metaphysical 
conception of what makes her who she is; just as when you respect someone as a person, 
you need not have a theory of personhood.  
 Think of the value of a work of art – say, Rodin’s Kissers. This work of art has 
value by virtue of being a work of art; it has value by being unique; it has value by being a 
good work of art; it has value by being beautiful, graceful, expressive, masterful. But it 
also has value by virtue of being the work of art that it is, the Kissers; (a value that differs, 
for example, from the value it has by virtue of being the piece of marble it is).64 It is 
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 This could be said about any work of art. But the value that one work has by virtue of being the work of art 
that it is can be very different from the value another work has by virtue of being the work of art that it is. 
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difficult to say what that value consists in; though it seems clear that its uniqueness, its 
being a work of art, its beauty etc. contribute to it, without exhausting it. Nevertheless, the 
notion that the Kissers has a particular kind of value by virtue of being the work of art that 
it is makes sense even in the absence of a theoretical account of that value. So does the 
idea that that value can be the object of appreciation. The same holds, I think, for the idea 
that an individual can have value by virtue of being the individual he is, and that that value 
can be the object of appreciation. 
 There are various ways in which one can appreciate a work of art and its qualities. 
One can love the feel and look of marble, and be in awe as to how that look can be brought 
out / enhanced / polished in a work like Rodin’s; or one can be in love, and be touched by 
suggestive representations of love, wherever one sees them; or one could be an aspiring 
sculptor and a connoisseur of Rodin’s work, and admire the new twist of skillfulness of a 
yet another masterpiece; or one could admire the beauty of the human bodies represented 
in the sculpture. In all these different ways, one focuses on one aspect, part or quality of 
the sculpture, and appreciates it. But there is also another way of appreciating the sculpture 
and its qualities. Rather than focusing on qualities of the sculpture considered individually, 
in separation, one can focus on how they contribute to making the sculpture the sculpture it 
is. One can appreciate the sculpture as a whole, and appreciate its qualities or parts as 
ingredients of that whole. Rather than focusing on and enjoying the look of marble in this 
particular sculpture, one can take in the look of marble insofar as it contributes to the 
overall aesthetic experience one has when looking at the sculpture. One can appreciate the 
look of marble not by itself, but as part of what makes this sculpture the sculpture it is.  
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 I think something similar goes on when one loves a person. One appreciates her wit 
or beauty not only as such, but also as part of who she is. The focus is not on the qualities 
themselves, but on the contribution the qualities make to the person. Nobody likes, of 
course, all of a person’s qualities. But there is a difference between picking and choosing 
qualities, and loving the person as a whole – even though the latter does not involve loving 
all the qualities. This is, I think, one reason why making comparisons is somewhat foreign 
to love, if not at odds with it. When what you notice is that your beloved is less funny (or, 
for that matter, funnier) than others, the focus is on funniness itself, and on how your 
beloved fares on the funniness scale. It is not on the beloved herself, and on her funniness 
as a part of her self.  
 There are various forms of love. You can love someone as a friend, as your child, 
as your romantic partner, as a student, as your parent, and so on. They all involve, I think, 
valuing the beloved for who she is; but they differ in that the way in which the beloved is 
seen as valuable differs from one kind of love to another. 
 When you love someone as a friend, the (value-laden) concept that structures your 
way of seeing him as valuable is the concept of a friend. The things that you notice about 
him, the qualities you respond to, are those pertinent to friendship: you typically respond to 
his kindness, wit, ease, his being a good chess player, a good sport, etc – rather than his 
being highly sexually attractive or earning $100,000 a year. Insofar as you love him just as 
a friend, you are not picking on the value he might have as a potential romantic partner; or 
the value he has as a brilliant mathematician; or as a moral saint. The value you respond to 
seems to be the value he has by virtue of being the friend that he is. This is not merely the 
value he has by virtue of being a friend. A response to that value, though common and 
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valuable in its own right, does not have the sensitivity to your friend’s identity 
characteristic of love. The concept of friend plays an important role in the way of seeing 
characteristic of loving someone as a friend; but what it does is not to circumscribe the 
value perceived to the value he has by virtue of being a friend. Rather, it defines the value 
responded to as the value he has by virtue of being the friend that he is – as contrasted to 
the value he has by virtue of being the person that he is, or the lover that he is, the student 
he is, etc. His identity is still crucial to the kind of value responded to, but the concept of 
friend fixes the aspect under which that identity is being valued. 
 The value someone has by virtue of being the friend that he is is also different from 
the value of being a good friend (though the latter might contribute to the former). It is a 
value given in part by his individual traits, relational and non-relational, that are relevant to 
his being a friend. Those traits need not be traits that make him a good friend; they only 
need to be traits that are relevant to friendship.  
 When you love someone as a person, you love her for being the person she is; it is 
the features that are relevant to her being a person that your love focuses on. When you 
love someone as a student, the features relevant to her being a student; and so on.  
 Now, it seems possible to love someone in a way that is not structured by the 
concept of friend, student, person, or the like. Love may not always be “love as.” In that 
case, it seems that the value one responds to is the value of being the individual that he or 
she or it is. As with works of art, it is difficult to say what that value consists in; just as it is 
difficult to say what makes an individual the individual it is. What seems clear is that it is 
not reducible to the value she has by virtue of being a person (or a pet, or a dog, etc.); 
neither is it reducible to the sum-value of her various qualities like wit, intelligence, 
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kindness, or beauty; nor to the value she has by being a unique individual. Her personhood, 
uniqueness, and qualities may contribute to that value, but they do not exhaust it. Now, I 
cannot develop here a positive account of that value, but I will sketch a hypothesis. Each 
individual has a point of view in the world; a point of view from which she experiences the 
world, and from which she acts. The hypothesis is that love is a response to that point of 
view – to its being a point of view, to its uniqueness, to its being the point of view that it is. 
Love, in its most general form, is a response to the value one has by virtue of one’s 
particular point of view in the world. One’s personhood and one’s personal qualities are 
relevant to love because they are part of what shapes a person’s point of view in the world.  
 Some features are essential to one’s point of view in the world, and valuing an 
individual in the way characteristic of love is impossible without valuing those features. 
For a person, personhood is an essential aspect of his identity, and thus failing to value his 
personhood amounts to a failure of valuing him for who he is, i.e. a failure to love him. 
This explains why you cannot love someone unless you also respect him.  
 Think of someone who owns a slave and sees all slaves as inferior beings, as sub-
persons. We can imagine this man to be very much emotionally involved with his slave: he 
is sad when she is not doing well, happy when she is, he makes all efforts to promote her 
well-being, he treats her as well as he would treat any non-slave lover, but he doesn’t see 
her as worthy of this treatment. He thinks and acts as if he is doing her a favor by treating 
her the same way he would treat a person. He takes joy and pride in her beauty, 
intelligence, and various talents, but does not see them as raising her to his own status. He 
sees these qualities as making her an exquisite slave – but not an exquisite person, because 
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he does not see her as a person at all. We wouldn’t say that his emotional attachment is 
love.65 
 We don’t need to go as far as owner-slave relationships to see emotional 
attachments that fall short of love for the same reasons. What is extreme about the slave 
owner case is that he actually believes that his lover is not a person. But one can, 
unfortunately, fail to see and value someone as a person even when one believes she is a 
person all right. Think of how often we hear the complaint “I want you to love me as a 
person, and not just as a woman / for my body / for my beauty” etc. This is a request for 
fully recognizing one’s personhood, and for seeing the value one has as a person.66 
 A conative conception of love as desiring the well-being of the beloved cannot 
explain why respect is a necessary condition for love. The valuing model of love does: you 
cannot value a person for who she is without valuing the core of what makes her who she 
is.  
  
 One of Velleman’s objections against a conative analysis of love is that it cannot 
capture the idea that when you love someone, you do things for her own sake. Suppose that 
I don’t particularly enjoy going to the synagogue, but my mother really wants me to go. So 
I go, for her sake. What is involved in acting for her sake? It may be tempting to say that 
acting for her sake consists in acting out of a desire to fulfill her wishes. But I can go to the 
synagogue in order to fulfill my mother’s wishes without doing it for her sake. I might 
want to fulfill her wishes so that she will leave me alone; or I may simply have a desire to 
                                                 
65
 In any case, not in the sense of “love” we typically have in mind when we talk about love for a person. As 
Bill Lycan pointed out to me, you might love a slave as you love your dog. 
66
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This is a request to be seen and valued not only as a person, but also as an embodied, sexual, gendered being. 
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fulfill her wishes, for no ulterior motives. But this isn’t the same as going to the synagogue 
for her sake. Now, one might point out that acting for my mother’s sake doesn’t 
necessarily involve acting out of a desire to fulfill her wishes (I could, for example, believe 
that it is not good for her if I constantly do what she wants, but that my going to the 
synagogue would help her social status, and so I go, out of a desire to do what’s good for 
her); however, one insists, acting for my mother’s sake can be explained in terms of 
whatever conative attitudes motivate me. But, Velleman argues, any conative attitude of 
someone who acts for my mother’s sake can be shared by someone who doesn’t act for her 
sake. 6768  
 Here is what I take to be involved in acting for someone’s sake. Suppose that I go 
to the synagogue out of a desire to fulfill my mother’s wishes. Typically, a desire like this 
is not free-floating: it is not a desire that I simply happen to have at this moment, and that 
is disconnected from my other desires, thoughts, emotions, beliefs. It usually stems from, 
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important, as I will go on to argue, is the substantive way in which the person figures in one’s motivation.  
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and is made intelligible by, a web of other attitudes. The difference between going to the 
synagogue for my mother’s sake and not for my mother’s sake is not perceptible at the 
level of the desire that ultimately motivates my action. It resides in the story behind that 
desire: in the way I conceive of my mother, and of her wishes, and the way her wishes 
affect me, the significance I attribute to them, and so on. The story need not always be the 
same, but some stories support acting for her sake, and some do not. The same is true of 
desiring a person’s well-being for her own sake: what is distinctive of desiring her well-
being for her own sake is the role she plays in the web of attitudes that ground my desire 
for her well-being. The mere absence of an ulterior motive does not make my desire a 
desire I have for her sake. What does make it a desire for her own sake is that fact that the 
desire stems from a way of seeing my mother as valuable in herself. 
 
 Let’s go back to the question: what are the attitudes, actions, thoughts, feelings one 
sees oneself as having reasons for, when one loves? Some of these can be easily read off 
various platitudes about love: caring about the beloved’s well-being, feeling happy when 
she is happy, contributing to her well-being when appropriate, wanting to be with her (in 
certain kinds of love), and so on. Now, I believe that it is also true that, when you love 
someone, you see him as irreplaceable; that is, you see the things that make him who he is 
as giving you reasons to treat him, feel about him, and think of him as irreplaceable. 
 I think that this feature about the way one values the person one loves is sufficient 
to explain the irreplaceability of the beloved. Irreplaceability is not a matter of the 
metaphysical nature of the beloved, of his intrinsic value, or of the nature of one’s reasons 
for love; rather, it is a matter of the way one sees the person one loves. When we say that 
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the person one loves is irreplaceable, we say that the lover’s replacing the beloved would 
not be intelligible. This unintelligibility is not due to the nature of the beloved, or to the 
reasons love is based on; rather, it is due to the fact that replacing the beloved is 
incompatible with the perspective of love. The commitment to seeing and treating the 
beloved as irreplaceable in the way characteristic of love makes the beloved irreplaceable. 
This commitment is not a response to a pre-existent irreplaceability that is to be explained 
by the nature or value of the beloved. Rather, it gives rise to that irreplaceability. 
 Some might be suspicious of the idea that love can make the beloved irreplaceable 
simply by seeing him as such, and find this process rather mysterious. But the process by 
which the beloved becomes irreplaceable is no more mysterious than the process by which 
a promise gives rise to an obligation. Before promising to vacuum your living room, I had 
no obligation to do so. Now that I’ve promised, I do. The reason I promised to vacuum was 
to get you to give me $20. Now you’ve paid me; but that doesn’t mean I now have a reason 
to refuse to vacuum. Similarly, Jack’s potential to be a good friend is a justifying reason to 
love him. Once I love him, a better potential friend might come along; but this doesn’t 
mean I now have a reason to love her instead of Jack. 
 The matter is complicated by the fact that one can adopt different perspectives on 
the same thing, and that different perspectives can be independent sources of different 
reasons. In the promise case, from the perspective of morality, the fact that I already got the 
money is not a reason to refuse to vacuum. But from the perspective of, say, self-interest, it 
may be a reason.69 Similarly, from the perspective of love, the fact that Jane would make a 
better intimate friend than Jack is not a reason to love her instead of Jack. From the 
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perspective of self-interest, it may be.70 But when we are saying that the beloved is 
irreplaceable, we are saying that he is irreplaceable from the perspective of love; that it 
would be unintelligible for the lover, qua lover, to replace him; we are not saying that there 
is no point of view from which one might have reasons to replace him. 
 The possibility of conflicting perspectives is what makes irreplaceability puzzling. 
Consider the following scenario. Brenda and Greg love each other, and have been in an 
intimate relationship for 7 years. Brenda has to relocate to the other coast, Greg cannot 
relocate, and the situation is not likely to change in the future. Brenda says: there is no 
chance we’ll be a couple again, so you should move on, find someone else to love, who 
lives in the same area. Greg is indignant. Now, from the perspective of one’s self-interest, 
from the perspective of one’s need for close relationships, one’s beloved is replaceable: if 
one loses a beloved, one can usually find someone else to love. But from the perspective of 
love, this way of reasoning does not make sense: the fact that one’s beloved does no longer 
live in the same town is not a reason to cease to love him and look for someone else to 
love. Just like, from the perspective of morality, the fact that you’ve got the $20 is not a 
reason to now refuse to vacuum.  
 However, the possibility of conflicting perspectives does not make it the case that 
the beloved is not, in fact, irreplaceable to the lover; from the perspective of love, replacing 
the beloved is unintelligible, even though there may be other perspectives from which it is 
intelligible. From the perspective of morality, the fact that you’ve got the $20 is not a 
reason not to keep your promise; and that is not changed by the fact that there may be 
some other perspective from which it is a reason. 
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 Like in the case of morality, one might make the argument that, if you think about it carefully, it will turn 
out that in the end it is not in your best interest to dismiss the requirements of love. But what I’m interested in 
here is that it is possible for the two perspectives to come apart. 
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 I have claimed that when one loves a person, one sees her as valuable in a certain 
way – that is, one sees the facts that make her who she is as giving one reasons for the 
feelings, attitudes and actions characteristic of love – in particular, for treating, feeling and 
thinking of the beloved as irreplaceable. But one may ask: are those facts such reasons? 
The worry is that, if they are not, in fact, reasons, then love is in some way defective in that 
it involves seeing reasons where there aren’t any.  
 One way of approaching this question is to say that, if the facts that make a person 
who she is are reasons for the feelings and actions characteristic of love, then we should be 
able to see, by looking at those facts as they are independently of one’s love for the person, 
what it is about them that makes them reasons for the feelings and actions of love. If there 
is nothing to see there, then they are not in fact reasons, and love is defective.  
 I believe this approach is misguided. A better question to ask is: does it make sense 
to see the facts that make a person who she is as reasons for the feelings and actions of 
love? That is, are those facts the kinds of things that can be taken as reasons, and is there 
anything good about taking them as reasons for the feelings and actions of love? If they 
are, indeed, the kinds of things that can be taken as reasons (and they are, because they are 
facts), and if there is a good justification, if there are good reasons for taking those facts as 
reasons for the feelings and actions of love, then there is nothing defective about seeing 
them as reasons. What makes them reasons for love is the fact that there is value in, there 
are reasons for, taking them as reasons.71  
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 Notice that the situation might be different if love (and valuing, in general) involved a belief about reasons. 
The value of seeing X as Y is a proper justification for seeing X as Y, but the value of believing that X is Y is 
not a proper justification for believing that X is Y; one needs epistemic reasons for believing that X is Y.  
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 VI. Reasons for love 
 
 It is part of the common sense conception of love that qualities like warmth, 
kindness, wit, intelligence are good reasons to love someone. But many philosophers are 
suspicious of this feature of the common sense view because, they believe, it is 
incompatible with the nature of love. The threat is perceived in various forms: if you love a 
person for her qualities, you don’t love her for her own sake; loving a person for her 
qualities is very close to loving the qualities, rather than the person; if you love a person 
for her qualities, the person is replaceable to you by someone with the same qualities. I 
will argue that these worries are unfounded. 
 
 (i) “Loving a person for her qualities is at odds with loving her for her own sake.” 
 Qualities like wit, warmth, kindness, intelligence seem to give a person 
instrumental value: your wit can make you valuable to me because you can entertain me; 
your kindness, because you are likely to treat me well and help me when I need help; your 
warmth, because it fulfills my need for affection; and so on. If you love a person for such 
qualities, the worry goes, it looks like you love her for what gives her instrumental value to 
you. And this seems incompatible with loving her for her own sake. This is a puzzling 
                                                                                                                                                    
Suppose that, when there is value in believing that X is a reason for Y, then believing that X is a reason for Y 
makes X, in fact, a reason for Y. Would then one have good epistemic reasons for believing that X is a 
reason for Y? Suppose that I have special powers, and my believing that grass is red makes grass red (and I 
know this). Do I have good epistemic reasons to believe that grass is red? If there is a causal connection 
between my belief and the color of grass, such that grass turns red when I form the belief that it is red, then 
the belief is not epistemically justified, because at the moment when I form my belief grass is not yet red. But 
the case of reasons is more difficult, because there my belief that X is a reason for Y is supposed to be partly 
constitutive of X’s being a reason for Y.  
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feature of our thinking about love. On the one hand, we think that the fact that a person is 
smart, can make you laugh, treats you with consideration, is very relevant to why you love 
her. On the other hand, we say that genuine love means loving the person for her own sake.  
 But the qualities that make someone instrumentally valuable can also contribute to 
the value she has by virtue of being the individual she is.  I can see the wit of a person as 
a quality that makes her capable of entertaining me. But I can also see the wit of a person 
as a quality that contributes to making her valuable in herself, to making her a being whose 
existence and flourishing are worth promoting for her own sake, whose existence and 
flourishing I have reasons and am motivated to support and contribute to, whether or not 
they affect my own well-being. If this is how one sees a person’s qualities, then it is not 
incompatible with loving her for her own sake – in fact, it is constitutive of it. 
 (ii) Reasons for love and the irreplaceability of the beloved 
 Some philosophers believe that there is an incongruity between the common belief 
that a person’s qualities are reasons for love, and the belief that the beloved is irreplaceable 
to the lover. If the reasons you love Mike are that he is kind, compassionate, witty, etc., it 
follows, they argue, that it shouldn’t make any difference to you if Mike left overnight and 
you woke up with John, who is also kind, compassionate, witty, etc. But it does make a 
difference to you, so, some say, it can’t be that kindness, compassion, and wit are reasons 
for loving Mike. This leads some philosophers to deny that love is based on reasons at all 
(Frankfurt); or to deny that personal qualities are reasons for love (Velleman, Kolodny72); 
or to interpret the metaphysical nature of these qualities in ways that allegedly ensure 
irreplaceability (Badhwar, for example, argues to the effect that John’s kindness - one of 
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 See Niko Kolodny, “Love as valuing a relationship”. 
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your reasons for loving him - is not to be understood as a universal he shares with Mike 
and others; rather, it is to be understood as a particular constitutive of him as an individual, 
that he cannot share with anyone; as an expression of his unique style as a person, a style 
that constitutes his essence.73) 
 I don’t think that we need to deny that a person’s qualities are reasons for love, or 
to defend a particular metaphysical interpretation of those qualities, in order to 
accommodate irreplaceability. In fact, I believe that the worry that if qualities are reasons 
for love irreplaceability is threatened is unfounded. The worry takes several different 
forms, all of which rest on problematic assumptions. 
 Here is a first version. If X’s properties A, B, C, D… are the reasons I love X, and 
if a different individual Y also has A, B, C, D…, then my reasons to love X are equally 
good reasons to love Y. I have no reasons to love X rather than Y. Therefore, it is not 
unintelligible to transfer my love for X to Y. Here is an example meant to support this 
argument. Suppose the only reason I desire to eat a piece of chocolate is that it is sweet. 
When someone offers me ice cream instead of chocolate and says it’s equally sweet, it 
would not be unintelligible to take the ice cream and forget about the chocolate. In fact, it 
would be a reasonable thing to do.  
 Although the example itself makes sense, there are several problems with the 
argument. First, the common-sense view is the view that a person’s qualities are good 
reasons to love the person. It is not the view that qualities are the only reasons we have in 
loving a person. Philosophers often argue as if love is either grounded on qualities-based 
reasons, or on historical reasons (i.e., reasons based on one’s common history with the 
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 See Neera Kapur Badhwar, “Friends as ends in themselves,” esp. pp. 19-21. 
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beloved), or on something else. But this need not be the case. One’s love for a person can 
(and typically is) based on both kinds of reasons. So even though a person’s qualities may 
not give one sufficient reasons to love that person rather than a similar other, this does not 
mean that her qualities cannot be good reasons to love her. One may have other reasons 
(say, historical ones) that do apply uniquely to her. I can desire chocolate both because it is 
sweet, and because it is the only thing that reminds me of my mom’s home-made cookies. 
The fact that only the latter reason is unique to chocolate does not show that its sweetness 
is not a good reason to want chocolate. 
 But suppose that A, B, C, D… are my only reasons for loving X. It still doesn’t 
follow that X is replaceable by Y. Suppose that I promise my six years old daughter a pony 
for her birthday, and the (only) reason for my promise is that I know she has been 
dreaming about it for months now, and a pony would make her very happy. But after I 
make the promise my husband, who spends a lot more time with my daughter, tells me that 
she has also been dreaming about a bicycle, and a bicycle would make her equally happy. 
(And, of course, he also points out that a bicycle is much less expensive than a pony.) This 
doesn’t mean that I can now change my promise to a bicycle instead of a pony. 
 One form the worry about irreplaceability takes is that loving a person for her 
qualities is suspiciously close to loving the qualities. At a first level, the difference 
between loving someone’s qualities and loving her for her qualities is straightforward: it 
resides in the object of one’s attitude. In the former case, you love the qualities; in the 
latter, you love the individual. But the worry is that this difference is not significant: that 
what happens when you love someone for her qualities is that you love the qualities, and 
love the individual only as an instantiation of those qualities. Hence the worry that loving 
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someone for her qualities is incompatible with irreplaceability. If you love the individual 
as an instantiation of certain qualities, the individual won’t matter to you as an individual; 
your love is transferable to any other instantiation of those qualities.  
 Here is why this argument has some prima facie appeal. Consider again the case of 
my desire for chocolate. When my reason for wanting chocolate is that it’s sweet, it seems 
plausible to think that I want something sweet, I represent chocolate as sweet, and as a 
result I want chocolate. I represent chocolate as sweet, and desire it under that description. 
The chocolate’s being chocolate, its cocoa content, its particular taste, etc. are irrelevant to 
my desire for chocolate. Now, what interests me here is the relationship between the 
content of my desire and my reason for wanting chocolate. In this case, the sweetness of 
chocolate is a reason for me to want chocolate because what I really want is something 
sweet. The fact that this is my (only) reason is thus an indication that I represent chocolate 
as sweet, and desire it (only) as such.  
 It seems that our last version of the worry about irreplaceability rests on applying to 
love this model of the relationship between one’s reasons and the content of one’s attitude. 
If one’s reasons for loving X are A, B, C, D…, then it must be, the thought goes, that what 
one really loves are A, B, C, D…, and X is the object of one’s love only insofar as it has A, 
B, C, D…; one represents X as A, B, C, D…, and loves her as such. The mistake here is to 
think that one’s reasons fix the content of one’s attitude, that they fix the way in which the 
attitude represents its object. Reasons are sometimes an indication of the content of one’s 
attitude, but not always. This is because, although sometimes what makes A a reason for B 
is the content of B, other times the story is different. The fact that John tells me that it will 
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rain tomorrow is a reason for me to believe it will be sunny. Why? Because John is a 
pathological liar, and I know it. 
 Loving someone for her qualities does not necessarily mean loving her as an 
instantiation of those qualities. The former has to do with one’s reasons for love; the 
second, with how one conceives of and values one’s beloved. When I love Mary for her 
beautiful blond hair, I take her beautiful blond hair to be a reason for loving her. Although 
sometimes this goes hand in hand with seeing Mary as a member of a class, it doesn’t have 
to. I can see Mary as an individual, and love her as such, while taking her beautiful blond 
hair to be a reason for loving her.  
  I take the above arguments to show that there is no inconsistency between the ideas 
that personal qualities are reasons for love, and the ideas that the beloved is irreplaceable, 
and that one loves a person for her own sake. At this point, one might push the question: 
okay, perhaps there is no inconsistency between taking personal qualities as reasons for 
love, and other features of love. But why should we think that personal qualities are 
reasons for love? If love was, say, a desire to be with the beloved, then we could see how 
qualities like wit, intelligence and the like would be good reasons for love (but, of course, 
in that case love would not be for the sake of the beloved). But if love involves, as I 
argued, seeing oneself as having reasons for the feelings, thoughts and actions 
characteristic of love, including irreplaceability, then why should personal qualities be 
reasons for love? Why is, for example, a person’s intelligence a reason for treating her as 
irreplaceable? This seems, again, puzzling, since intelligence is a quality she shares with 
others, and as such it does not seem to warrant irreplaceability.  
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 I believe that the mistake here is to think that the reasons for treating a person as 
irreplaceable are such reasons because they make the person irreplaceable. (I think it is this 
mistaken assumption that lead some to deny that personal qualities can be reasons for love, 
or to give personal qualities a metaphysical interpretation that makes them unique to an 
individual). If this were the case, it would be indeed difficult to see how personal qualities 
could be reasons for love, since, if anything, they make the person replaceable. But this is 
not the story we need to hear. What we need to understand, if my account of love as 
valuing is right, is why personal qualities are reasons for valuing a person for who she is – 
among other things, for seeing and treating her as irreplaceable. So the question we need to 
ask here is: what is the role that this way of valuing people plays in our lives? If we 
understand that role, then we can see whether it makes sense for this way of valuing to be a 
response to personal qualities – that is, whether personal qualities warrant, or give reasons 
to, this way of valuing.  
 Why is fear a warranted response to danger? The answer to this question has to do 
with the role of fear: fear is, say, an emotion whose functional role is to promote survival 
by motivating the agent to avoid danger.74 Given this functional role, it makes sense to 
experience fear in response to danger. It wouldn’t make sense to experience fear in 
response to pleasure (barring special circumstances).  
 To understand warranting reasons for love it would make sense, then, to look at the 
role love plays in our lives. Here is one way one might want to go here. Love makes 
possible close relationships between people, relationships that enhance our lives in various 
ways. People in love-based relationships rely on each other for emotional and practical 
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 The exact contour of the story about fear is not important for our purposes here.  
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support, they shape, to a large extent, each other’s self-concept75 and character, they are 
often engaged in common projects and form shared intentions, plans, and attitudes towards 
the world. There are several different ways in which love is necessary for this kind of 
relationship to exist. Its characteristic concern for the other’s well-being makes possible 
the trust needed for this degree of closeness and the vulnerability it entails. Treating the 
beloved as irreplaceable ensures, to some extent, the stability needed for embarking in 
shared long-term projects. The positive quality of the emotions characteristic of love 
provides a balance to the difficulties endemic to close relationships and an incentive to 
overcome them. And as I will discuss shortly, being valued for one’s own sake by one’s 
intimates is crucial for one’s sense of self-worth and for one’s agency. 
 Since an important role that love plays in our lives is to make possible relationships 
of this kind, love makes sense as a response to those qualities of a person that make her a 
potentially good partner in such relationships. 76 The concrete shape of a love relationship 
varies from case to case and from one type of love to another, and so what counts as good 
reasons to love a person will depend both on the agent’s own personality, and on the kind 
of relationship in view. Typically, kindness, generosity, honesty, intelligence, a sense of 
humor, and the like tend to promote good close relationships, and are therefore good 
reasons to love someone.77  
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 Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett argue for this view in “Friendship and the self”. 
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 Hugh LaFollette makes a similar argument in his book Personal Relationships: love, identity, and 
morality. See esp. pp. 61-81. 
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 My focus here has been on non-relational qualities, but it is worth mentioning that an implication of this 
view is that relational qualities concerning the other person’s attitude towards the agent may also be reasons 
for love. The fact that she loves you, likes you, admires you, respects you, etc. are qualities of a person that 
make good premises for a good relationship, and hence justifying reasons for love. This consequence seems 
to fit with our intuitions about love: the fact that a person loves you is a reason to love her (though, of course, 
not a sufficient reason, but neither is any other one reason).  
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  VII. The characteristic value of love  
 The proposed model of love as a way of valuing construes the relationship between 
the motivations and emotions characteristic of love, on the one hand, and the appreciation 
of the person’s value, on the other hand, in a way different from both Frankfurt’s and 
Velleman’s. On this model, when you love a person, your desire for her well-being is not 
free-floating, à la Frankfurt; neither is it merely caused, or “unleashed,” as Velleman puts 
it, by the appreciation of the person’s value. Rather, your desire for her well-being, as well 
as your emotional reactions – your happiness when the beloved is doing well, your sadness 
when she is unhappy, etc. – are grounded in, and seen by the agent to be grounded in, the 
value of the beloved.78 I believe that this feature explains better an important aspect of the 
value characteristic of love. 
                                                                                                                                                    
I do not mean to imply, however, that anything that may support a good relationship is a good reason for 
love. The fact that she lives in California and you like the climate there, or that she has a great income and 
financial security tends to be a good premise for a good relationship, doesn’t make these reasons for love. 
Here is why. X cannot be a justifying reason for Y unless it is also a warranting reason for Y. It cannot be a 
good thing to respond to X with Y if it’s not intelligible to respond to X with Y. And, for reasons I discuss 
below, love is not intelligible as a response to a person’s location.  
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 One worry about this account is that it seems to imply that only the existence and flourishing of persons 
who have qualities like wit, intelligence, kindness, etc. is worthwhile, whereas we believe, of course, that any 
person’s flourishing is worthwhile, simply by virtue of her being a person. But we need not have this worry. 
Loving someone involves seeing her in a certain value-laden way; it involves seeing her as warranting one’s 
personal concern and interest and a host of emotional reactions. This is not incompatible with seeing all 
people’s existence and flourishing as valuable. The kinds of value perceived in the two cases are different. 
The value all people have as people warrants respect. As persons, all people are equally valuable. But people 
are not valuable only as people. For example, they are also valuable as athletes, teachers, members of the 
homo sapiens species, etc. Love is, I will claim, a response to a certain kind of value that a person has that 
goes beyond her value qua person. That response involves seeing that kind of value in a particular person as 
warranting and justifying (though not requiring) the motivations and emotions characteristic of love. It will 
become clear later in the chapter that that kind of value, unlike the value a person has by virtue of being a 
person, does not entail an obligation to appreciate it. An analogy with the value of art might be in order here. 
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 Many psychologists and some philosophers point out that one of the most 
important contributions love relationships make to a person’s life is promoting and 
maintaining one’s sense of self-worth. Our self-image and sense of self-worth are shaped 
to a large degree by the way others see us and treat us. If we understand love as a way of 
valuing a person, it is not difficult to see how love contributes to one’s sense of self-worth. 
When you love someone, you see her as having a kind of value that warrants concern for 
her well-being, commiseration, happiness at her achievements, treating her as 
irreplaceable, etc. Since, as social psychologists point out, we tend to see ourselves and 
treat ourselves the way others (especially close others) see and treat us, your seeing your 
beloved as worthy of care, understanding, striving for happiness, will support his seeing 
himself as worthy of the same.  
 This explains several things. It explains why we see only certain qualities, and not 
others, as good reasons for love. We do not want to be loved for our blond hair because we 
do not believe that that is the kind of quality that makes our existence and flourishing a 
good thing, desirable for its own sake. Implying that that is what makes us worthwhile can 
be seen as an insult, as a way of saying that there is nothing more valuable to us. We want 
                                                                                                                                                    
If a painting is an exquisite work of art, its value as a work of art might entail an obligation to preserve it; but 
it does not entail an obligation to be ecstatic every time I see it. If I am color-blind, or simply have no taste 
for that kind of art, there is nothing wrong with my spending my time listening to music instead. But if I am 
capable of appreciating and becoming ecstatic at its particular value – the value it has not simply by being a 
work of art, but in virtue of its particular artistic qualities – that value warrants and justifies my ecstatic 
response. Similarly, the value a person has qua person entails an obligation to respect her, but not to love her. 
The value she has by virtue of certain qualities does not require, but warrants and justifies a love response, 
where that occurs. 
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to be loved for “who we really are” – that is, for those qualities that we ourselves believe 
(or are open to believing) make us individuals whose flourishing is worthwhile.  
 Love’s value in supporting one’s sense of self-worth also explains why the 
irreplaceability of the beloved, and the specific role her identity plays in grounding love, 
are crucial features of love. If someone’s concern for you were not based on an 
appreciation of who you are, it would not convey the message that you are worthy of such 
concern, and therefore make no difference to the way you see and treat yourself.  
 If love didn’t involve seeing the beloved as irreplaceable, then it wouldn’t convey 
the message that you are worthy of concern. Here is how I think irreplaceability comes into 
play. In order to be able to function as a practical agent, you need to be able to see the fact 
that something is your desire, aim, intention, project, dream etc. as a prima facie reason to 
act on it.79 It would be useless for an agent to form a desire, intention, or the like, if she 
never took these attitudes to give her reasons for acting on them. Imagine what it would be 
like to form an intention to go for a walk at 7 pm, but then, at 7 pm, to think of the fact that 
you have the intention to take a walk as giving you no reason whatsoever for taking the 
walk. The number of actions that are worth performing at any point in time is large; and if 
one did not regard the fact that one has a preference, desire, or plan to perform one of those 
actions rather than the others, one would have no way of choosing between all possible 
equally good actions, and would be paralyzed to inactivity.  
 In order for one to function effectively as an agent, it is necessary, then, to be able 
to see oneself as the source of reasons for action in this way. Love can support this kind of 
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 John Broome argues, in “Are intentions reasons”?, that intentions do not constitute reasons for action; 
rather, they provide a “rational justification” for action that is different from reasons. For my purposes here, I 
will ignore the possible distinction between reasons and rational justifications. The argument I make above 
can be made by using the concept of rational justification instead of reasons throughout. 
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sense of self-worth only if the beloved is seen as irreplaceable. If I desire your well-being 
in a way that does not differentiate between you and other (possible or actual) people with 
the same qualities, my desire for your well being does not say that you, as an individual, 
are worthy of being cared for, it does not say that the fact that something contributes to 
your well-being (as opposed to “to a person’s well being,” or “to the well being of a 
person with qualities x, y z”) is a reason to pursue it, that the fact that something would 
fulfill your desires or dreams is a reason to go for it.  
 Seeing the beloved as irreplaceable is also a condition of the characteristic dynamic 
of relationships based on love, and one of the aspects of love that enable it to bring 
meaningfulness into the lover’s life. 
  
Chapter 3: How valuing gives rise to special “oughts” 
 
I Peculiar oughts 
You’ve been a Tar Heel fan since the first game you saw. It was love at first sight, 
and for years you’ve followed their ups and downs, you’ve been worried when they were 
stumbling, hopeful when they were challenged, happy, excited and proud when they won 
one game after another. Recently you’ve transferred to NYU, and you forgot the Tar Heels, 
and are rooting for the Violets. 
Paula is a painter, and painting is her passion – it is, in her own words, what she 
lives for. She is fascinated by this art form, by its possibilities, by the power of good 
paintings to move people, by the transforming and intriguing experience of bringing a 
painting to life. She’s been striving to be the best painter she can be, to create paintings 
that can fascinate, she has devoted many years to developing and polishing her skills, and 
made a lot of progress. One day, Paula is offered a permanent contract with a high-end 
interior design company. They need paintings that fit with the decorating projects of the 
designers, and that appeal to the taste of the targeted customers. The job would leave her 
no time or energy for what she considers to be authentic painting. But it is easy work and 
would afford her a comfortable life style. Paula decides to take the job.  
Patrick is a fifty year old catholic priest. In his twenties, he fell in love with Sara; 
unfortunately, she was already in love and engaged to her now husband, Morton. Patrick 
never stopped loving her, but, out of respect for her relationship with Morton, he has never 
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declared his love. He has chosen to be a casual friend of the family, and he is their priest, 
but keeps his love in the background. Now, Sara’s son is falsely accused of armed robbery. 
Patrick is convinced that a famous detective could prove his innocence and save him 
fifteen years in prison, but hiring him costs a fortune, and Sara is poor. Patrick has the 
money, but wants to use it for a dream trip to Japan. 
 
Something seems to be wrong in each of these cases. Many – especially other Tar 
Heel fans - would be outraged by your new allegiance to the Violets. Even a neutral party 
would disapprove of your behavior. It looks like a betrayal; there are no good reasons for 
your change of allegiances, and you should feel guilty or ashamed.  
We’d also have little respect for Paula’s decision. She is not true to her passion for 
painting. She gave up her dream for the sake of comfort. Moreover, she is betraying her 
artistic values: the choice to produce commercial paintings is inconsistent with her 
conviction that painting should strive at artistic excellence, and not at pleasing the 
customers. Similarly, if Patrick chooses to spend his money on the trip, when he could 
prove the innocence of his beloved’s son, he is not true to his love for her.  
What I find interesting about these cases are the grounds for our disapproval. In the 
Tar Heel case, even if we think that the Tar Heels and the fan community are in no way 
affected by losing you as a fan (you’re an introvert, a quiet fan, always watching the games 
on TV), many people will still think that there is something disquieting about your change 
of heart. You are betraying your allegiance to the Tar Heels. Similarly, our judgment of 
Paula does not necessarily rest on the thought that, had she continued to be a painter, she 
would have produced good art, which would have benefited other people. What we react to 
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is her attitude towards her own values: she is not true to them. Likewise, Patrick is not true 
to his love for Sara: even though he is not her husband or lover, and thus has no role 
obligations to give up his dream trip for her sake, we still think he ought to have done so, 
because he loves her.  
In what follows I would like to take a closer look at the reasons for our disapproval 
in such cases. I will argue that the conception of valuing proposed in chapter one can help 
us to better understand those reasons.  
 
One question we might be concerned with is whether our disapproval of cases like 
those of the Tar Heels’ fan, the passionate painter, or self-effacing lover is moral in nature. 
I believe that it is, but a full-fledged defense of this claim would require a discussion of the 
difference between the moral and the non-moral. My main concern, however, is not to 
show that our disapproval is moral; rather, it is to gain a more precise understanding of the 
grounds for our disapproval. In any case, I think that, as a by-product of this investigation, 
the picture that will emerge in the end will show why one might be inclined to believe that 
those grounds are moral. 
 
One thing to notice about these cases is that the stories are likely to elicit not only 
disapproval, but also surprise. We don’t expect ardent fans to switch teams, or people to 
abandon their life passions for the sake of comfort, or fail to help those they love when in 
dire need. A true fan, people will say, would not have switched teams; were she really 
passionate about art, she wouldn’t have given it up for comfort; had he really loved her, the 
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thought of going on a trip rather than saving her son’s life wouldn’t have even crossed his 
mind.  
It is not obvious how we should understand these assertions. At first, it looks like 
they are expressing conceptual truths: a true fan doesn’t switch teams; you don’t count as a 
fan if you switch teams; you don’t count as loving if you let your beloved down when she 
most needs you. But this can’t be true: we also think that people sometimes do betray their 
allegiances, fail to live up to their own values, let down those they love. This wouldn’t 
make sense if something would count as an allegiance, as one’s value, or as love only if the 
person would never betray it. The very notion of betrayal wouldn’t make sense: it is 
precisely because one loves, that certain actions count as a betrayal of love.  
How are we, then, to understand these claims? I think that the best way to interpret 
them is as expressing and / or applying evaluative standards implicit in the deployed 
concepts. Concepts such as fan, love, allegiance, personal value, valuing, have both 
descriptive and normative conditions of application. The descriptive conditions: one counts 
as a fan only if one likes the team, watches a reasonable number of games, roots for the 
team, and the like. But imagine a society where some people satisfy all these conditions. 
However, none of them, nor anyone else in that society, thinks there is anything wrong 
with rooting for the opposite team at the same time, or switching back and forth between 
teams, or wearing the opposite team’s colors at the game, etc. In this society the practice of 
fandom wouldn’t exist, and we wouldn’t call these people fans. It is implicit in the concept 
of fan that a fan is subject to certain norms about how to root for the team, when, if ever, it 
is appropriate to switch teams, etc.  
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One interesting thing about some of these concepts is the interplay between the 
descriptive and the normative. Respecting at least to some extent some of the norms is a 
descriptive condition. If you consistently root for the opposite team, you don’t even count 
as a fan. More interesting for my purposes here: in the case of some of these concepts, the 
agent has to see himself as subject to the norms implicit in the concept, in order for the 
concept to apply to him. A person who sees nothing wrong with rooting for the opposite 
team doesn’t count as a fan. A person who doesn’t think he ought to stand by his beloved 
when in need doesn’t count as a person who loves.80  
I think that the fact that some of our concepts referring to attitudes have normative 
conditions of application indicates that we believe we are subject to certain norms 
whenever we have those attitudes. What goes wrong in Paula and Patrick’s cases is that 
they break norms they are subject to by virtue of valuing art and loving a person. The 
question we need to answer is why we are subject to such norms. 
 
Notice, first, that in both Paula’s and Patrick’s case, there are no explanations of the 
grounds for our disapproval that do not appeal to their attitudes. If Paula didn’t have a 
passion for art, there would be nothing wrong with her taking a job with an interior design 
company. Not everyone ought to pursue artistic excellence, or devote their life to art. We 
think that Paula ought to have continued to strive for excellence as a painter; but the reason 
we do so is not that artistic excellence is intrinsically valuable, or that painting as an art 
form is intrinsically valuable. We may think, of course, that they are intrinsically valuable, 
but it does not follow from this that people ought to strive for artistic excellence. We 
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believe, however, that Paula should have; and what’s special about her is the way she 
values art. Similarly, there are no external reasons why Patrick ought to give up his 
vacation to help Sara. He is not her husband, or otherwise related to her; they are not in a 
relationship. And, of course, the mere fact that Sara needs help, and he is in a position to 
help, doesn’t entail that he ought to do so. It is because he loves her that we think he ought 
to do so. 
But why would one, merely by having a certain attitude, be subject to an additional 
set of norms? This idea will strike many as odd. And, if having the attitude renders me 
subject to new norms, can’t I just get out of it at will by giving up the attitude? Granting 
that we are, indeed, subject to norms like: “if you love X, you help her when in need”; 
can’t one get out of the demand to help simply by ceasing to love X? But notice that this is 
not the logic of the norms we are considering. Ceasing to love X because you don’t want to 
help (or, in general, because doing what love requires you to do is hard, demanding, or 
inconvenient) is itself a violation of the norms of love. The norms we are considering do 
not have the form: “you ought to [if you love X, help her],” i.e. “you ought to [either help 
X, or not love her]”; they have the form: “if you love X, then you ought to help her.” The 
norms are contingent, but not hypothetical: although they are contingent on having a 
certain attitude, i.e. one is subject to them only if one has the attitude, they do not have the 
form of hypothetical imperatives, they are categorical. Once the attitude is in place, one is 
subject to a categorical imperative.  
This idea is not all that unfamiliar. Some of the norms involved in our practices and 
institutions take this form as well. It is true that many of the norms of our practices are 
hypothetical. For example: “If you are a teacher, you ought to show up for class every 
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time.” If you don’t want to come to class, you can quit and stop being a teacher; doing this 
won’t violate any of the norms of being a teacher. But some norms are not hypothetical in 
this way: for example, norms pertaining to when, under what circumstances, and for what 
reasons it is legitimate to quit, exit the practice, or give up the attitude.81 If your job 
description says: “you ought to give us two months notice before quitting,” your quitting 
today without notice does not get you out of the norm; it constitutes a violation of the 
norm. Many of the norms that govern close relationships, and many of the norms that 
govern valuing attitudes are of this sort. They are norms about what constitutes a good 
reason for ending the relationship, or about what constitutes a good reason for ceasing to 
value something or someone. Hence ending a relationship, or ceasing to value something, 
for reasons that are not within the bounds that are recognized by the relationship or by the 
attitude as good reasons may constitute a betrayal of the relationship or of your attitude (of 
your love, allegiance, passion, vocation, etc.). Had Paula taken the job, for example, 
because she was in deep financial trouble, that would not have counted as a betrayal; but 
taking the decorating job merely for the prospect of a marginal increase in comfort does. It 
does because the decision to take the job signifies more than just taking a job; it says 
something; it says that the art form of painting is not, after all, worth her life effort; that it 
is not worth sweating over, giving up luxury, striving for excellence. And this is 
inconsistent with Paula’s previous attitude towards painting, which involved seeing 
painting as what made her life worth living, as worth dedicating her life to. Similarly, 
Patrick’s decision not to help Sara has a significance that goes beyond that of its immediate 
practical effects (her son’s conviction). It is a decision that says: she is not, after all, worth 
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the sacrifice of my dream vacation; and that is inconsistent with love as an assertion of her 
value as worth significant sacrifices.  
 
So far I have explained why we should think that at least some of the norms 
involved in valuing are, though contingent on the attitude, categorical. The question 
remains: why are those norms binding for us?  
There are two different questions in this vicinity. Those who believe that the mere 
desire to do X does not give one (even a prima facie, defeasible) reason to X are struck by 
the difference in normative status between desire and valuing: the mere fact that one values 
X does give one a reason to X. So the first question is: what explains the reason-giving 
force of valuing? This question is independent of my particular account of valuing. A 
second question, which is specific to my account, is: if it is true that valuing X involves 
seeing oneself as subject to certain norms about how one should think, feel, act with 
respect to X, why is one, in fact, subject to those norms when one values X? Though 
distinct, the two questions are related, so I will start by discussing some answers that have 
been proposed to the first question, and then address the second directly. 
The fact that I value my career in philosophy gives me a justifying reason to pursue 
it. Now, some people believe that merely wanting a career in philosophy would also give 
me a justifying reason to pursue it.82 Others believe that a mere desire wouldn’t give me a 
reason. In any case, we need an explanation for why valuing gives me a reason. Those who 
think that desire also gives me a reason might be tempted to think that the explanation for 
the reason-giving force of valuing is the same, or similar, to the explanation in the case of 
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desire. But here is a reason to think this is not true. Assume, for the sake of the argument, 
that desire and valuing are both reason-giving; there still seems to be a difference between 
the justificatory power of desire and of valuing. The reasons given by valuing are weightier 
and, perhaps, of a different kind than those of desire. If my child needs money to go to 
college, and the only way to make it would be to quit my job in philosophy and take up a 
job in law, the mere fact that I desire a job in philosophy doesn’t seem to give me the right 
kind of reason to choose not to quit, whereas the fact that I value my job might.  
There are a few interesting stories about why valuing is reason-giving in the way 
that it is. One common thread, which appears in significantly different versions in different 
authors, is the role that valuing plays in agency; others, related, are the relationship 
between valuing and one’s identity, between valuing and integrity, and between valuing 
and autonomy.  
Christine Korsgaard’s account of normativity in general is a good example of a 
story that explains the normativity of our values as grounded in our nature as autonomous 
agents. As self-reflective beings, she says, we have the capacity – and, with it, the 
inescapable need – to reflect on what pulls or pushes us to act in a certain way, and ask 
ourselves whether we have a reason to act that way. Insofar as we are agents, i.e. have 
practical reason, we cannot conceive of ourselves as acting and choosing for no reason. But 
reasons are derived from principles. Moreover, in order for us to be autonomous agents, 
these principles cannot be imposed from the outside; they must be self-imposed. 
Korsgaard’s argument, as I understand it, is that, unless we regard some principles as 
normative for us, we cannot see anything as a reason for action, i.e. we cannot be agents; 
and unless these principles are self-imposed, we cannot be autonomous. But we are, 
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inescapably, by virtue of our reflective nature, autonomous agents. Hence we must regard 
our self-imposed principles as normative for us. Hence their normativity.83  
Korsgaard proposes this as an account of normativity in general, and makes the 
further claim that this account of normativity can explain the normativity of the moral law. 
But what I am interested in here is whether this could be a good account of the normativity 
of valuing. Here is how the story would go: what we value gives us the most fundamental 
principles to use in deliberation. Without such principles, deliberation, and hence practical 
reason, and hence agency would not be possible. In order to be practical agents, we must 
regard these principles as normative for us; but we are, inevitably, practical agents, and so 
we must regard these principles as normative for us. Therefore, they are normative for us. 
First, let me say a bit more about what I take to be involved in regarding a principle 
(or a policy, a rule, a standard, or a maxim) as normative for oneself. When one regards a 
principle as normative, one takes oneself to have reasons to act (or feel, or think) in 
accordance with it. The force of those reasons will depend on the nature and content of the 
principle. In some cases, the agent will think (explicitly or implicitly) that the principle 
provides him with considerations in favor of acting in accordance with it; in others, that he 
ought to so act, or that he must, has to, or is obligated to. The scale from “considerations in 
favor” to “obligated to” is two-dimensional. It tracks, at the same time, a gradation in the 
normative stringency or “insistence” of the principle,84 and the size of the gap between 
what the principle asks from one and what one is (or would otherwise be) motivated to do. 
One typically sees something as an obligation when it is both the case that it is stringent 
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that one fulfill it, and that one has motives in the opposite direction. But a principle can 
have for an agent the same force or stringency as an obligation, without there being a 
conflict between what the principle asks, and what the agent is motivated to do. This is, I 
think, the case when someone says, like Martin Luther, “Here I stand. I can do no other” – 
when it is unconceivable for one to violate a principle.85 Similarly, one can regard the 
responsibilities of love as having the same force or stringency as, say, a moral obligation, 
without experiencing the (potential) conflict between what one has to do and what one is 
inclined to do characteristic of obligation. The strength or stringency the principle has for 
the agent translates, psychologically, into the intensity of the guilt or shame that the agent 
will, under normal conditions, believe to be warranted and experience if he violates the 
principle.  
Back to Korsgaard. Her account relies on some strong and controversial claims 
about the source of reasons in general. One could take issue with every step of her 
argument: with the claim that in order to have reasons, there must be principles; that 
autonomy requires that the principles be self-imposed; that it follows, from the fact that we 
cannot conceive of ourselves as practical agents unless we see our self-imposed principles 
as normative, that they are actually normative for us.  
Let’s assume, contra Korsgaard, that self-imposed principles are not the only 
source of reasons available to an autonomous agent. I believe that Korsgaard’s account 
contains an insight open even to someone who disagrees with her general claims about 
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reasons, agency and normativity. Suppose one thinks that the reasons we use in 
deliberation are given by what is, as a matter of fact, valuable. We take the fact that our 
proposed action would involve taking someone else’s property to be a reason against the 
action; and it is a reason because stealing is, in fact, wrong – and not because of some self-
adopted principle. We take the fact that lighting one more cigarette will bring me closer to 
cancer as a reason against it; and this is because cancer is bad, and not because of a self-
imposed principle; and so on. Now, let’s assume that there are reasons of this kind. 
Suppose that one took into account, in one’s deliberation, all such reasons - all reasons that 
arise from what is objectively good or bad, right or wrong, etc. One would often still be 
confronted with a choice about what to do. Objective values do not settle the question 
about what to do; more often than not, a variety of possible actions are open.  
Now, if our assumptions are right, then it is not true that, in order to be an agent at 
all, one needs to regard self-adopted principles as normative. However, in order to be an 
effective agent, one may need to regard self-adopted principles as normative. Since, even if 
there are objective values, they would underdetermine decisions, an agent who would have 
no other strategies for making decisions would often get stuck in the first steps of the 
deliberation process, and not reach any practical conclusions – like a computer running on 
an incomplete program. We could have been the kind of agents who, when objective 
values underdetermine decisions, made a random choice between permissible options. But, 
had we been those agents, our lives would have been very different. We wouldn’t have 
been capable of long-term projects, relationships, commitments; we wouldn’t have been 
able to shape a life, or to shape a life in a way that expresses who we are.86  
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Now, if we think of an effective agent not just as an individual capable of action, 
i.e. an individual whose deliberation results in action, but more richly, as an agent capable 
of bringing into existence complex structures of actions, possibly of shaping a life,87 then 
the idea that, in order to be an effective agent, one must regard one’s self-adopted 
principles as normative may become appealing.  
A first thought here is that, in order to build structures of action that stretch over 
time, an agent needs to adopt principles for deliberation and choice that supplement the 
ones objectively established. Moreover, those structures cannot come into existence unless 
the agent abides, with sufficient consistency, to those principles.  
One can imagine an agent who is effective in the way described, but who does not 
regard his principles as normative: he simply always deliberates, makes choices, and acts 
in ways consistent with them. It is pretty clear though that, as a matter of psychological 
fact, we are not thus constituted: we are subject to temptations, we often have conflicting 
desires, we are often lazy or weak, etc. So it seems true that, given our psychology, in 
order to be effective agents we need to have self-adopted principles and regard them as 
normative. We can shape our lives or create unified structures of action by bringing into 
play the motivational resources that are available to us as creatures capable of seeing 
ourselves as subject to norms - the motivational resources of “ought.”  
Now, if this is true of our make-up, then as a matter of psychological necessity we 
need to regard self-adopted principles as normative in order to be effective agents. 
Korsgaard’s argument was that it is a constitutive necessity for us as agents to regard self-
adopted principles as normative for us, and that therefore those principles are, in fact, 
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normative for us. It doesn’t seem plausible that there is such a constitutive necessity, and, 
if there were one, it is not clear that actual normativity would follow from it. Does actual 
normativity follow from the psychological need described?  
It doesn’t follow directly; we are in need of an argument here. One argument that 
could be made is that it is in our nature as agents (either constitutively, or psychologically) 
to aim at being effective agents. If that is an aim we necessarily have, and if regarding self-
adopted principles as normative is necessary to achieve that aim, then we must do it; and 
perhaps this is as close as we can get to establishing that those principles are, in fact, 
normative. But I don’t think there is much hope for this argument. There doesn’t seem to 
be any such necessity to aiming at being an effective agent. 
A more modest, and I think more promising, line of argument is to look at what is 
good about being an effective agent. What does the fact that we see self-adopted standards 
as normative enable us to do? If the things it enables us to do are very valuable to us, if 
they are things that most of us want, and perhaps need, and / or if they are things that 
significantly enrich our lives, or maybe are even essential to a good life, or are building 
blocks of a moral community, we would have good reasons to see self-adopted standards 
as normative for us. And this, I think, is enough to explain their normativity. The more 
significant the good, the better the reasons to see the standards as normative; the better the 
reasons, the stronger the normative force.  
Before pursuing this line of argument, let me take a step back and look at a couple 
of alternative ways of explaining the normativity of valuing. Though I think that in the end 
they don’t work, they too offer some insights about what is good about taking one’s values 
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as normative. All of them stress, albeit in very different ways, the relationship between 
valuing and one’s identity. 
An argument proposed by Korsgaard cashes in the relationship between valuing 
and the agent’s identity understood as practical identity (rather than metaphysical).88 By 
practical identity she means the conception the agent has of himself: a description of who 
he is under which he values himself and finds his life worth living. One can conceive of 
oneself as a human being, a person, a parent, a friend, a lover, a citizen, a firefighter; 
typically, one’s self-conception is composed of several such descriptions. These 
conceptions involve reasons and obligations: a parent ought to take care of his children, a 
citizen has a reason to be interested in public life, and so on. Korsgaard’s argument starts 
from the claim that our self-reflective nature forces us to have a conception of ourselves. 
For this reason, she claims, the obligations built into our self-conceptions - especially the 
ones that are part of our most central self-conceptions, the ones that we cannot shed – are 
normative for us. Serious or repeated violations of the norms implicit in a self-conception 
will make it impossible for an individual to continue to think of himself under that 
description; he will have to give up that identity. And, even though some identities can be 
given up, one cannot be an agent unless one has some identity. Violating the norms 
threatens the agent’s identity, and the loss of identity means that the agent is, for all 
practical purposes, dead.89  
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If violating one’s values would indeed mean one’s death as an agent, this would be 
a good reason to accept their normative force. The death metaphor might be getting at 
something true, but Korsgaard’s interpretation of it is not satisfying. First, even though 
having some self-conception may be needed for agency, and perhaps, as Korsgaard claims, 
there are some core identities that are inescapable, most of them are not. For those that are 
not, one can very well imagine an agent who, whenever an identity is inconvenient, sheds 
it off and takes on a new one. Now, this may be psychologically difficult or even 
impossible for beings like us, and so the agent we are imagining would have to have a 
different psychological make-up than we do. But the point is that the impossibility of 
shedding identities does not come from the nature of agency: violating an identity doesn’t, 
by itself, threaten an agent’s capacity to be an agent. Since all he needs is some identity to 
act from, he can always, in principle, give one up and take on another.  
There are a couple of elements in Korsgaard’s argument which I think are 
suggestive, but I think she puts the wrong spin on them, and I would like to take them in a 
different direction. First, I do think that violating the norms implicit in one’s self-
conception threatens one’s identity; but this is not because, after you’ve violated them, you 
cannot maintain that self-conception. Rather, what threatens the self-conception is the fact 
that, unless one takes its norms seriously, unless one genuinely sees oneself as subject to 
them, one does not have that identity in the first place. This is why some violations 
threaten the identity, whereas some do not: some violations are consistent with seeing the 
conception as normative for one, whereas others are not – they show that the agent does 
not, in fact, take the norms seriously.  
 93 
Whether or not Korsgaard is right that one cannot be an agent unless one has a 
practical identity of the kind she describes, I think that our self-conceptions do play an 
important role in our lives, that our values are building blocks of our self-conceptions, and 
that the normativity of our values stems in part from their place in our self-conceptions. 
More on this later.  
A different way of explaining the normativity of valuing appeals to the role it plays 
in the agent’s metaphysical identity. One reason why people are reluctant to see desires as 
reason-giving is that they seem to be forces that act upon the agent, rather than expressions 
of the agent’s will. What one values, though, seems to be at the core of the agent’s identity, 
and therefore valuing has a different status than desire: valuing is the voice of the agent, 
and hence it has the authority of expressing the agent’s will.  
Michael Bratman suggests that an agent values X “when it has a desire for X (a 
desire that may itself be a first-order policy) and a self-governing policy in favor of 
treating that desire as providing an end that is justifying (perhaps to a certain, specified 
degree) in motivationally effective deliberation.”90 This is one of the attitudes that make 
possible the kind of coordination, organization and stability over time needed by 
sophisticated agents like us. Moreover, he claims, it is one of the attitudes that constitute 
an agent’s identity over time. Bratman assumes a broadly Lockean conception of personal 
identity, and points out that policies that favor or reject various desires – of which valuing 
is a subtype – have it as their role to support various continuities of desires and of the 
policies themselves, and as such they constitute and support the temporally extended 
structure of agency. Given that valuing is part of what metaphysically constitutes the 
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temporally extended agent, valuing has the authority to speak for the agent. Now, Bratman 
himself, as far as I am aware, does not make this further move, but one could make the 
argument that valuing can give rise to reasons because it represents the agent’s will91.  
The thought that valuing constitutes personal identity is, I believe, the wrong 
direction to look into for an explanation of the authority and normativity of valuing; 
focusing on the metaphysical identity of the person doesn’t help. If one accepts a broadly 
Lockean view of personal identity over time, attitudes like valuing do not seem to have a 
special place among our attitudes. Valuing, and other policies, might have a special role in 
ensuring cross-temporal continuity of our agency. But as far as metaphysical personal 
identity is concerned, valuing is on a par with other mental states: a desire that lasts in 
time, or the fact that a (perhaps fleeting) desire I have now is the result of a desire I had 
earlier, or of a thought that I had earlier, or the fact that I now remember a past desire, or a 
past perception – all these connections between present and past mental states ensure the 
kind of psychological continuity that constitutes identity over time. Perhaps Bratman wants 
to defend a particular kind of Lockean conception of personal identity, on which only the 
cross-temporal connections made possible by valuing and other policies form the right 
kind of psychological continuity needed for identity over time; but that view is in need of 
an argument. 
We have, again, a powerful intuitive idea: that valuing is at the core of our identity, 
and that somehow that fact gives valuing a special status among our attitudes, a special 
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authority and normative force. But we don’t seem to have a satisfying explanation of that 
idea.  
 
We can resume now the line of argument I suggested earlier, and ask again the 
question: what is valuable about taking the norms implicit in valuing to be binding for us? 
One thing already mentioned is that seeing self-adopted standards as normative enables us 
to have long-term projects, relationships, commitments; and most people would agree that 
these are of great value to us.  
But there is also something valuable in itself about the attitudes that fall under the 
category of valuing: about various kinds of love, respect, appreciation, passion for a 
vocation, commitment to a cause, and so on. One thing people often say if asked why these 
attitudes are valuable is that they can give meaning to one’s life.92 In the next chapter, I 
will give an interpretation and defense of this claim.93 Now, assuming that valuing 
attitudes are indeed thus valuable, what does this mean for their normativity? As I will 
argue, the normativity of valuing is essential for its capacity to make one’s life meaningful. 
If that is true, then, given the value of having a meaningful life, we have a strong reason to 
accept the normativity of valuing.  
Valuing-type attitudes contribute to valuable relationships not only because they 
ensure stability and coordination of the agent’s motivations over time; but also because 
they shape the nature of those relationships. A relationship based on love is of a different 
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kind, and has a different value than one based on mutual interest; a relationship based on 
respect has a different value than one based on fear of punishment; a vocation has a 
different value than a career. But one of the differences between these kinds of 
relationships, which partially accounts for their differences in value, is given by the norms 
involved in the attitudes that ground them. The value of the relationships made possible by 
attitudes like love is one reason to accept the normativity of love. Furthermore, as I will 
argue in the next section, the best way to understand special obligations which arise within 
such relationships is as stemming from the normativity of the valuing-type attitudes that 
form the basis of the relationships. 
  
II Special responsibilities of friendship 
If your best friend just had a life-threatening accident, you would rush to the 
hospital without thinking twice. If you learned about the accident right before a crucial 
meeting at work, you will likely be torn between your friend and your job. You will be torn 
because you want both to be there for your friend, and to do your job well; but also 
because you will think, rightly, that you ought to be there for your friend, and also ought to 
attend the meeting.  
The idea that we have special responsibilities of this sort is quite familiar from 
everyday experience, where such conflicts are common.94 However, the nature of these 
responsibilities is puzzling. Why is it that I ought to be there for my friend, and why is it 
that I ought to do my job well?  
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 I am focusing on conflicts because, in the absence of conflict, people will usually simply want to visit their 
injured friends, and will visit them. The sense that one ought to visit one’s friend typically arises only when 
there is a conflict with something else one ought to do, or with something else one wants to do. But I am not 
interested here in conflicts as such. 
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A first answer is straightforward: because he is my friend, and because it’s my job. 
This is an interesting answer if we construe the why-questions as questions about the 
reasons people take themselves to have for helping their friend or doing their job well; we 
will come back to this. But it is a rather unsatisfying answer if what we want is to 
understand the source of the responsibilities we have with respect to our friends or our 
jobs. Why is the fact that he is your friend a reason to rush to the hospital? Moreover, why 
is it an “insistent” reason – that is, why does the fact that he is your friend make it the case 
that you ought to support him?95 
Special responsibilities have been the focus of some recent debates in normative 
ethics, primarily because they seem to pose problems for both Kantian and consequentialist 
moral theories. They seem, for instance, to pose a challenge to these theories’ 
interpretations of the idea that morality is impartial. If the responsibilities we have towards 
our friends are (as they seem to many) moral responsibilities, then it looks like morality 
often requires us to be partial: I have a special duty to support my friend when he has been 
in an accident, while I do not have the same duty to support all accident victims. Many 
have argued that neither Kantian, nor consequentialist ethics can make room for this 
partiality in a satisfactory way. 
My interest here in special responsibilities, however, is driven by a different 
concern. I believe that an investigation of the sources of these responsibilities can give us 
some insight into what is involved in valuing things like our friends or our jobs; in turn, an 
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 This way of phrasing the question may be prejudging the answer, in that it already presupposes that it is the 
fact that he is your friend that gives rise to your responsibilities towards him. I don’t mean to be prejudging 
the issue, but it doesn’t look like one can give substance to questions about the sources of such 
responsibilities in a completely neutral way.  
I will use “ought to” and “have to” interchangeably. 
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understanding of the attitude of valuing will help get clearer on the nature of these 
responsibilities. 
 
 The question about the sources of special responsibilities is interesting in its own 
right, and it is a large question, even if one focuses only on special responsibilities of love 
and friendship, as I will in this section. A thorough investigation of the various conceptions 
of friendship that have been proposed, and of their implications for special responsibilities, 
is more than I can do here. Instead, I will draw one possible picture, and say a couple of 
things about why its obvious alternatives would not work, with the hope that the picture 
will appear appealing enough even in the absence of a detailed rejection of all other 
alternatives.  
 Good friends rarely ask themselves about the reasons why they should help their 
friends, but imagine that you are a good friend in a philosophical mood, and ask yourself, 
“Why ought I to visit my friend at the hospital?” “He needs my help” may come to mind 
first; but, by itself, this won’t do as an answer, since a million other people need your help 
as well. You might answer (as some philosophers have) that you ought to visit your friend 
because he expects you to, and therefore you would hurt him by violating his expectations, 
in a way that you wouldn’t hurt the one million other people; or because your past 
interaction with him as a friend built up to something like a mutual promise to help each 
other when in need, and you ought to keep that promise.  
 Obviously, expectations by themselves do not give rise to an obligation. Your 
secret admirer at work might believe that you are an extremely kind person, or be under the 
impression that you take an interest in him, and therefore he might expect you to visit as 
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well, but you are under no obligation to do so. If the expectation does create a 
responsibility, it must be legitimate, and its legitimacy must be of the right kind; the trick 
is to explain when the expectation is legitimate in the right way.  
 Imagine that your secret admirer is someone to whom you have, albeit 
unintentionally, given reasons to think that you are his close friend. In some sense, his 
expectation that you would visit him in the hospital is then legitimate: he has good reasons 
for his (unfortunately false) belief that you are his friend, and his expectation is based on 
that belief. But it doesn’t follow that you owe it to him to visit him in the hospital; you owe 
him, at most, a clarification.  
The situation is similar, I think, even if you have intentionally made him think you 
are his best friend - but, in fact, are not, and do not want to be. His expectations are 
reasonable and justified. But it does not follow that you owe it to him to be his best friend, 
and to visit him at the hospital. It follows that you owe him whatever we owe to people we 
intentionally deceive, but this does not necessarily include friendship, or acts of friendship. 
Perhaps some will disagree with this, and argue that, if I intentionally lead someone 
to believe that he is my best friend, then I do have an obligation to visit him in the hospital. 
Be this as it may, it seems clear that the obligation I have towards my friend to visit him in 
the hospital is not of the same nature as the obligation I have towards the person I 
intentionally deceive; the reason I have to visit my friend is very different from the reason I 
have to visit the person I deceive. 
 
To see why this is so, let’s go back to the spontaneous response to the question: 
why should I help my friend? The response was: because he is my friend; and this seems to 
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be the right answer. This is a sufficient reason why I ought to help my friend: simply 
because he is my friend.  
What we are looking for, then, are not the reasons why I should help my friend. We 
already have an answer to that question in the apparently flat and uninformative: “he’s my 
friend.” In various circumstances, there may be additional reasons to help our friends: they 
expect us to, or they’ve helped us in the past, we’ve sort of promised to help them, etc. But 
we don’t need to have those reasons in order to see ourselves as bound to help our friends. 
Typically, “he’s my friend” is a sufficient, insistent (though not always decisive) reason to 
help him. What we need is an explanation of why this is a reason. If this is what we are 
looking for, then expectations and promises are the wrong direction to look into.96  
 
Consider a few platitudes about friendship. In a close friendship, one cares about 
one’s friend for his own sake. In so caring, one is disposed to be happy when the friend is 
doing well, sad when he is not doing so well, concerned when he is in trouble, willing to 
help when the friend needs help, ready to offer emotional support, but also to give him 
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 Unless promises are seen as constitutive of friendship – an option I will consider later.  
There are other reasons to think that expectation is the wrong way to go: even if my friend thinks I am out of 
the country, and does not expect me to come to his help, I still ought to help him. This doesn’t completely 
settle the issue; perhaps one can still find room for expectations by changing the content and/or the function 
of the expectation: my friend expects that, if in town, I will come to his help. If I violate his expectation, 
there is the risk that he will find out and be hurt. However that may be, I think that the more important reason 
why we should not focus on expectations is the fact that, even though sometimes they may be part of the 
explanation for why we ought to help a friend, they will not help with explaining why the fact that he is my 
friend is a sufficient, insistent reason to help him when in need. To put it differently: even if expectations do 
play a role in explaining the obligation that I have to help a friend in a particular case, they play that role in 
virtue of being legitimate in the right way; but what makes the expectation to be helped legitimate in the right 
way is the fact that it is my friend’s expectation. What needs to be explained then is, if you like, why the fact 
that it’s my friend’s expectation makes it legitimate in the right way. (All this doesn’t imply, of course, that 
only one’s friend’s expectations can give rise to obligations, or that all my friend’s expectations give rise to 
obligations. If my best friend expects me to buy him a helicopter, he’s just crazy. The idea is that a friend’s 
particular expectation to be helped when in need – and other, similar expectations – are legitimate in the right 
way because they are my friend’s).  
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space in the right contexts, and so on. If one genuinely cares about one’s friend in this way, 
these dispositions will be relatively stable in time, and will not falter at the slightest 
difficulty or inconvenience. One will be willing to balance the friend’s interests with one’s 
own, and give them comparable weight in one’s decisions. 
 This description of what is involved in friendship seems right, as far as it goes. But 
it doesn’t go far enough. While it explains why people usually help their friends, do not 
abandon them for no good reason, etc., it does not explain why one ought to help one’s 
friend when in need, not abandon him for no reason, etc. Why would the fact that I am 
disposed to help someone when in need entail that I also ought to help him, or that I should 
continue to be so disposed in the absence of reasons to the contrary? The mere presence of 
a set of such dispositions does nothing to explain the obligations we take ourselves to have 
towards our friends even in the absence of expectations on their part. And if, instead of 
dispositions, we talk of desires, the same problem arises.  
This might lead one to think that we cannot find an explanation for the 
responsibilities of friendship if we look at the mental states involved in friendship; perhaps 
we should look somewhere else. Some have argued that friendship should be modeled as a 
kind of promise, or a contract.97 I think any such attempt is bound to fail, for the following 
reasons. In order for a promise or a contract to be in place, it is sufficient that certain 
actions be performed: if I say “I promise to pay you $100,” in the right context, I thereby 
obligate myself to pay you $100; similarly if I sign the right papers in the right context. It 
doesn’t matter whether I intend or am motivated to keep my promise. Even if, right as I’m 
uttering the words “I promise to pay you $100,” I am laughing inside, thinking to myself 
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 See Richard White, “Friendship and commitment”.  
 102 
“There’s no way I’ll pay you,” and have no intention to pay you, this is irrelevant to the 
promise and its bindingness. I am still obligated to pay you. The same is true of contracts.  
But friendship is different. In order for a friendship to be in place, it is essential that 
the friends have intentions, beliefs and motives characteristic of friendship. No amount of 
outward manifestations of friendship can bring about a friendship, in the absence of the 
right mental states: no matter how much time we spend together, how many activities we 
share, and how many times I tell you that we are friends, there is no friendship involved if, 
say, I do not in fact want us to be friends. There may be some obligations that arise from 
these outward manifestations; but they are not obligations of friendship; they are not the 
kind of responsibility that I take myself to have when, thinking about my friend in the 
hospital, I say to myself: “I have to visit him.” A genuine promise and a false promise are 
equally binding, and binding in the same way; a false friendship and a genuine friendship 
are not. 
To understand the special responsibilities of friendship, we have to look back 
inside, at the way in which friends care about each other. But we need to focus on 
something else than the dispositions and desires involved in caring.  
Here is the view I will defend. One of the things constitutive of friendship is that 
friends value each other as friends. It is this component of friendship that gives rise to the 
special responsibilities characteristic of friendship. First, I will use the account of valuing 
proposed in chapter one to describe what it is to value someone as a friend. Next, I will 
explain how this form of valuing gives rise to responsibilities. 
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There are different ways in which one can value an object. One can value a work of 
art, for example, as a work of art, or as a gift from one’s lover, as an expensive possession, 
as part of one’s home, etc. One can value a dog as one’s pet, as an exemplar of a rare 
breed, or as a sentient being. One can value a person as a person, as one’s employee, or as 
one’s friend.  
My valuing a work of art as a work of art is different from my valuing it as an 
expensive possession in that the thoughts, feelings, and actions I will be disposed to 
perform, and the thoughts, feelings, and actions I will see as appropriate or warranted, will 
be different in the two cases. When I value it as a work of art, I will probably (at least 
attempt to) aesthetically appreciate it, contribute to its preservation when that is needed, 
enjoin other people to appreciate it, etc., and I will also see myself as having reasons 
(perhaps insistent reasons) to do so. If I value it (only) as an expensive possession, I will 
also try to preserve it, possibly try to exchange it for a more expensive one, but I will not 
necessarily try to appreciate it aesthetically, and so on.  
What accounts for this difference in the way I can value the same object is that, 
when I value something, I see it via an evaluative concept - typically, a thick evaluative 
concept. The reasons I take myself to have when I value something are based on the norms 
implicit in the evaluative concept that informs my way of seeing and my valuing of that 
object.  
When I value someone as a friend, my attitudes, thoughts and actions towards him, 
as well as the attitudes, thoughts, and actions that I will take myself to have reasons for, 
will be guided by the norms implicit in the concept of a friend. In valuing someone as a 
friend, I will, for example, be disposed to help him when in need, but also see myself as 
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having a duty to help him. The idea that friends help each other is built into our notion of 
friendship. In seeing someone as my friend, I see myself as bound by the norms that we 
regard as constitutive of friendship,98 and helping each other is one of them.  
In other words, valuing someone as a friend involves seeing his need as an 
(insistent) reason to help him, the fact that he enjoys basketball as a reason to watch the 
game with him, the fact that he leaves town soon as a reason to visit him, etc. Valuing 
one’s friend in this way is an essential constituent of friendship. Spending time with the 
friend, engaging in common activities, liking each other, trusting each other, sharing 
things, exchanging confidences, etc. are typically important ingredients of friendship. But 
no close, “genuine” friendship is in place in the absence of the friends’ valuing each other 
as friends. If the characteristic interactions of friendship form the body of a friendship, 
mutual valuing is its heart.  
Now, the interactions characteristic of friendship – the sharing of confidences, the 
close proximity, etc. may give rise, by themselves, to obligations that we do not have 
towards strangers. But there is nothing “special” about those obligations; that is, they are 
not obligations particular to friendship. They are obligations that we have towards any 
people, which happen to be instantiated in the case of friendship: the obligation not to 
create expectations you cannot fulfill, not to betray a confidence, to help a person who 
needs help when you are the person best situated to help, etc.  
However, not all responsibilities of friendship are of this kind. Some of them 
depend essentially on the existence of a friendship. Those are the obligations that we 
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 I can also see myself as bound by the norms constitutive of this particular friendship, which can be 
different from, or a modification of, the norms involved in the generic conception of friendship implicit in 
our concept of friendship. That is, the way I value my friend can be informed by our (my friend’s and mine) 
shared, likely tacit, conception of what our friendship consists in. 
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recognize when, asked why we have them, we respond: “because he is my friend.” What 
those are may depend on the specific nature of the friendship, but some typical examples 
are: providing emotional support when needed, being attuned to the friend’s sensitivities, 
actively seeking to promote his interests, etc. These obligations, I believe, cannot be 
explained by the pattern of outward interactions characteristic of friendship. They arise 
from the way in which friends value each other. They wouldn’t be in place in a 
“friendship” that consisted merely of the outward manifestations of friendship.  
Now, how do the special responsibilities of friendship arise from valuing? Here is 
the story I would like to suggest. Valuing someone as a friend consists in part, as I noted, 
in a commitment to the norms characteristic of friendship. As I argued in section one of 
this chapter, the commitment characteristic of valuing is binding for us, due to the role it 
plays in our agency, to its centrality to our self-conceptions, and to its contribution to 
meaningfulness. In addition, the commitment involved in valuing someone as a friend is 
what makes possible close friendship. This commitment is the foundation for a pattern of 
interactions – including actions, feelings, ways of conceiving of each other, motivations - 
characteristic of friendship.99 Those interactions wouldn’t be what they are in the absence 
of that commitment. Suppose, for example, that one day you play tennis with someone you 
just met at the club, and another day you play tennis with a close friend. Let’s imagine that 
everything that takes place on these two occasions is exactly the same: you make the same 
moves, say the same things, have the same feelings. Nevertheless, these two interactions 
are very different, and not only in the numerical sense: they have different meanings, just 
like moving something that looks like a pawn on something that looks like a chessboard in 
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 Needless to say, this commitment is very different from that of a promise or a contract. The motivations 
characteristic of friendship, e.g. wanting to benefit the friend for his own sake, are incompatible with 
conceiving of the friendship as a promise. (Though, of course, it is possible to make promises to friends.) 
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a world where there is no game of chess is a different action, with a different meaning, 
from moving a pawn on a chessboard in the context of a game of chess. The meaning of 
the latter action is given by its place within a pattern of moves that form the game, and that 
pattern is made possible by the rules of the game, and by the player’s commitment to the 
rules for the time of the game. Similarly, the meaning of a tennis match with a close friend 
is given by its place in the pattern of interactions that forms the close friendship, and that 
pattern is made possible by the friend’s commitment in valuing each other as friends.100 
The commitment ensures the stability of friendship, enables the friends to depend on each 
other, trust and rely on each other, and on the continuation of the relationship in making 
individual and shared plans, etc.  
My argument here, like in section one, is that the norms an agent sees himself as 
subject to in valuing something are binding for the agent because of the value of the things 
valuing makes possible for the agent. Valuing someone as a friend is at the basis of close 
friendships, and it is to a large extent the distinctive value of close friendships that gives 
the norms implicit in valuing a friend their hold on us. Moreover, in the case of friendship, 
what the agent’s valuing makes possible (if met with similar valuing on the friend’s part) is 
of value for both the agent and the friend, and this brings in an extra layer of normativity – 
an obligation not to endanger something valuable to another.  
 
One of the assumptions this chapter’s argument rests on is that valuing is essential 
for a meaningful life. Next chapter will attempt to make good the promise to justify this 
assumption. 
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 Again, that commitment is, of course, different from the commitment involved in playing a game of chess. 
  
Chapter 4: Valuing and the good life 
 
 I will start from the assumption that meaningfulness is an important aspect of a 
good life101, and will argue that the attitude of valuing is needed for meaningfulness, and 
thus for a good life.102 My argument has two main aims: the first is to underscore the role 
and significance that valuing has in our lives, and thereby to support and further clarify 
claims made earlier about the normativity of valuing; the second is to show that 
understanding the nature of valuing along the lines I suggested earlier helps us to better 
understand how a life can be meaningful. 
 There are two sets of questions one can hear about meaning and life. On the one 
hand, there are questions like: “Does life have a meaning?,” or “What is the meaning of 
life?” On the other hand, people sometimes worry: “Is my life meaningful?,” “How can I 
live a meaningful life?,” or, if one is a guru or religious leader of some sort, one may offer 
advice on how to attain meaning in your life. Questions in the first set are out of favor 
nowadays. They are questions about whether life in general has meaning - as opposed to 
the particular life of a particular individual - and, when phrased as: “What is the meaning 
of life?,” they rest on the controversial assumption that there is one single meaning of 
life.103 Questions in the second set do not necessarily assume that life in general has a 
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 For a defense of this assumption, see Susan Wolf, “Happiness and meaning: two aspects of the good life”.  
102
 For a different account of the centrality of valuing in a good life, see Stephen Darwall’s chapter “Golub’s 
smile” in his book Welfare and rational care. 
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 David Wiggins makes this last point in “Truth, invention, and the meaning of life”. Susan Wolf notes, in 
“Happiness and meaning,” that questions about meaning have been traditionally understood as questions 
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meaning. Moreover, they might even express a very different concern from the first set. 
Although some people still ask – especially in a religious context – “Does my life have a 
meaning?,” many who think that there is a difference between meaningful and meaningless 
lives would be reluctant to say that there is a meaning for one’s life. The distinction 
between meaningful and meaningless lives, they would say, can be drawn without 
assuming that there is such a thing as the meaning of one’s life.  
 This chapter is not about the meaning of life. I am interested mainly in the 
differences between meaningful and meaningless lives, and the role the subject’s attitude 
of valuing plays in them. I think, however, that there is a continuity between the first and 
the second set of questions,104 and that, although there are dangers in failing to see the 
differences, there are also benefits to seeing them as expressions of similar concerns.  
 Philosophers disagree both on what we mean when we say that a life is meaningful, 
and on what it takes for a life to be meaningful. One strategy for discussing 
meaningfulness would be to start with a conceptual analysis of the expression “meaningful 
life,” and, once the meaning of that expression is clarified, to find its conditions of 
application. This won’t be my strategy. I will start with some standard examples of 
meaningful lives, and with what seems (and has seemed to many) to be a plausible view of 
what it takes to have a meaningful life. I will then argue that the best spelling out of that 
view will take an agent’s attitude of valuing to be central to his having a meaningful life. 
                                                                                                                                                    
about the human condition: whether or not life is meaningful does not depend on the particular shape of that 
life, but on the place or role of human life in the universe. 
104
 Susan Wolf expresses a similar viewpoint in “Happiness and meaning,” where she claims that traditional 
worries about the meaning of life and contemporary concerns with meaningfulness are expressions of the 
same kind of longing for meaning.  
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Along the way, the argument will shed some light on what we mean when we say that a 
life is meaningful. 
   
 Paradigmatic cases of meaningful lives often cited in the literature include the lives 
of Einstein, Mother Theresa, Picasso.105 One thing these lives have in common is that they 
contain things of objective value: revolutionary scientific discoveries, extraordinary charity 
work, excellent artistic creation. So it may be tempting to think that this is what makes 
them meaningful. However, even though such objectively valuable ingredients make these 
lives in some sense valuable, they are not sufficient to make them meaningful – to give 
them the particular kind of value we ascribe to a life when we call it meaningful. The life 
of an Einstein who had no interest in science, but happened to be a genius and worked in 
science only to impress his sulky lover, or that of a Mother Theresa constantly bored with 
her charity work, do not seem to be all that meaningful, even if they accomplish the same 
objectively valuable scientific discoveries or charity work. Or imagine a guy who lives his 
whole life in a room with a purple button. He happens to like purple, so he spends a lot of 
his life pressing the button, over and over again. Unbeknownst to him, every time he 
presses the button he causes a person’s life to be saved, so by the end of his life he has 
saved the lives of a million people. His actions produce as much good in the world as 
Mother Theresa’s, but his life is not thereby meaningful. It doesn’t seem any more 
meaningful than the life of the person who spends all his time counting blades of grass 
with no further results. 
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 See Richard Taylor, “The myth of Sisyphus”; Susan Wolf, “Happiness and meaning: Two aspects of the 
good life; David Wiggins, “Truth, invention, and meaning”. 
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 Examples of this kind have led many philosophers to say that objective value is not 
sufficient for meaningfulness; that an agent’s life is meaningful only if some subjective 
conditions are met as well. In Susan Wolf’s well-known phrase, “meaning arises when 
subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness.”106 The question is, what are the 
relevant subjective attitudes, and how do they contribute to meaningfulness? 
 There are several reasons why one might think that the agent’s subjective attitudes 
are essential for a meaningful life, and the differences between them are significant.  
 One view would be that there is something objectively valuable about some of the 
attitudes an agent can have towards things of value - appreciation, active engagement, 
enjoyment, pleasure, desire, love, caring, awe - and that the kind of value we ascribe to a 
life when we call it meaningful simply is composed of both the objective value of things 
such as scientific discovery or charity, and the objective value of attitudes such as 
appreciation or love. In order to be meaningful (or perhaps fully meaningful), a life needs 
both. If you are Mother Theresa but are bored by your charity work, your life is still 
valuable (and perhaps partially meaningful), but you are missing on something else that is 
valuable: enjoyment, or an appreciation of the value of your work, or the like.  
 This view doesn’t seem plausible to me. There are two possible versions. One is 
that meaningfulness is an additive value: the more things of objective value a life has 
(whether those consist in external facts, or in the subject’s attitudes), the more meaningful 
it is. The other version says that both external facts and internal attitudes are necessary for 
meaningfulness; in order to be meaningful at all, a life also needs the right attitudes. The 
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additive version seems implausible because it says that the life of the guy who spends his 
life pressing the purple button is to some extent meaningful. But it’s not. It’s no different 
from the life of a mouse who would live in the same room and step over the button to get 
to the cheese, thereby saving the lives of millions; and we wouldn’t call the life of the 
mouse meaningful. One might say here: you’re right about the mouse, but that’s merely 
because we only attribute meaningfulness to lives of persons, so the fact that the mouse’s 
life is not meaningful says nothing about the meaningfulness of the purple-lover’s life. But 
the point is that there has to be a reason why we only attribute meaningfulness to the lives 
of people. And a view that sees the value of the agent’s attitudes for meaningfulness as on 
a par with and additive to that of, say, contributing to the welfare of others cannot explain 
why only the lives of persons can be meaningful. There is something about the value of 
things like contributing to the welfare of people, scientific discovery, etc. that goes beyond 
their value qua contribution to welfare or scientific discovery, and makes a specific 
contribution – meaningfulness - to the life of the person. It is a contribution it could not 
make to the life of a non-person, and the only way to explain this is by appealing to the 
capacities that a person has and a mouse lacks. 
 The all-or-nothing view is implausible because it doesn’t have the resources to 
explain why both external facts and the subject’s attitudes are necessary for 
meaningfulness. If they contribute to meaningfulness only because they are objectively 
valuable, then they should be interchangeable – a sufficient amount of external facts should 
compensate for a lack of the right attitudes.107 
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needed for a meaningful life is that they are objectively valuable, if their only contribution to meaningfulness 
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 A different view would be that, in the absence of the right subjective attitudes, the 
value of your accomplishments, relationships, or other things of objective value is 
somehow lost on you. If you’re always bored by the charity work, then your work is still 
valuable, in that it contributes to other people’s well-being, but it does not have the right 
kind of value for your life that would contribute to its meaningfulness. This view seems 
more plausible; but we need an account of that right kind of value, and an explanation of 
the role that the relevant subjective attitudes play in it.  
 
 A version of this view is that the objective and the subjective are both necessary for 
the emergence of the right kind of value that makes a life meaningful. In David Wiggins’ 
words, value properties are lit up by the focus the man who lives the life brings into the 
world.108 There is, Wiggins argues, no one true answer to the question: “How should I live 
my life?” At the same time, not any answer will do. The world constrains the possible 
answers (it “impinges” upon us109), but it underdetermines them, thus leaving us both with 
the opportunity and with the necessity to invent meaning. 
 One way in which an agent’s attitude of valuing might be needed for his having a 
meaningful life is as a condition for the existence of value. If you think that a meaningful 
life is a life that (perhaps among other things) contains things of value, and your general 
theory of value says that it is by valuing things that individuals create value, then you will 
think that the attitude of valuing is necessary for a meaningful life.  
                                                                                                                                                    
of objective value could make the same contribution to meaningfulness, and so the subjective attributes are 
replaceable.  
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 David Wiggins, “Truth, invention, and the meaning of life,” p. 165. 
109
 Wiggins, p. 165. 
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 But suppose you think that at least some things are valuable, even valuable for a 
particular agent, independently of being valued by the agent; for example, that the 
disinterested Einstein’s contributions to physics are valuable tout court even if he doesn’t 
value them, or that a person’s well-being is valuable to her even if she doesn’t value it.110 
You could still think that it is only when an agent values things that they “light up” for him 
– that they become valuable in the right way that contributes to the meaningfulness of his 
life. The question is, what is the “right way”? 
 
 In working towards an answer, let us look first at the role the experiences of 
meaningfulness and meaninglessness play in a meaningful life. Imagine that Mother 
Theresa’s whole life is dominated by the feeling that there is no point to her charity work. 
She cares about the children she helps, about their health and happiness. But at the same 
time, she believes that a life can be meaningful only if there is a God and an afterlife, and 
she is convinced that there is no God or afterlife. So she thinks that her life is meaningless, 
that the lives of those she helps are meaningless, and that in helping them she merely 
prolongs other meaningless lives. The satisfaction she feels in saving the lives of people 
she cares about is always tainted by a sense that there is no real point to saving them, that 
her satisfaction is unwarranted, yet another absurd reaction to the world. Or imagine that 
for Einstein the experience of scientific discovery is no different from the experience of 
solving crossword puzzles; he thinks that there is no point or value to scientific progress, 
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 This view is compatible with many different accounts of value, including one that insists that it is by 
valuing that we (this time, we as a society or community or the human kind) create value by valuing things. 
What it denies is that the agent himself, as an individual, must value a thing in order for that thing to be 
valuable and thus contribute to the meaningfulness of the agent’s life.  
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since we die anyway, and that scientific work is just a somewhat pleasant way of passing 
one’s time before one dies.  
 If we discovered that this was the way Einstein and Mother Theresa lived their 
lives, I think we would be much less inclined to say that their lives were meaningful. The 
experience of meaningfulness seems an important aspect of the meaningfulness of one’s 
life. When we want our lives to be meaningful, we don’t want them merely to measure up 
to some objective standard: we want to experience life as meaningful. This desire is a 
desire for a subjective experience; in this respect, it is similar to the desire for pleasure. But 
it is different from the desire for pleasure in that it is at the same time sensitive to the 
objective circumstances of one’s life: we don’t want the illusion of a meaningful life, we 
want an experience that is truly an experience of a meaningful life. Unlike concern for the 
mere feeling of pleasure, concern about meaningfulness is at the same time a concern 
about the way one’s life actually is. But it would be misleading, I think, to say that it is a 
concern about how one experiences one’s life, combined with one about how one’s life is. 
The person who wants meaning in his life and worries about meaningfulness is more like a 
person who wants to see, and worries about whether he can see: what he wants is not 
merely to have a visual experience; at the same time, what he wants is not for the outside 
world to be a certain way; he wants to see it. He wants to have a visual experience that is a 
reflection of the way the world is. Similarly, the person who wants his life to be 
meaningful to him wants it to appear meaningful to him, and this appearance to reflect 
something about the way the world is.   
 What are the objective conditions that would warrant the experience of 
meaningfulness? Let’s take a closer look at what is involved in the experience of lack of 
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meaning – at what one takes to be missing in one’s life when one experiences it as 
meaningless. Here is how Tolstoy describes it: “(…) When I thought of the education of 
my children, I said to myself: ‘Why?’ Or, reflecting on the manner in which the masses 
might obtain their welfare, I suddenly said to myself: ‘What is that to me?’ Or, thinking of 
the fame which my works would get me, I said to myself: ‘Alright, you will be more 
famous than Gogol, Pushkin, Molière, and all the writers in the world – what of it?’ And I 
was absolutely unable to make any reply. The questions were not waiting, and I had to 
answer them at once; if I could not answer them, I could not live. I felt that what I was 
standing on had given way, that I had no foundation to stand on, that that which I had lived 
by no longer existed, and that I had nothing to live by…”111 
 Tolstoy’s experience of meaninglessness seems to be the experience of lack of 
reasons to live, of lack of reasons for the actions, desires, interests, feelings etc. that made 
up his life. What had previously seemed good reasons to work and to invest himself 
emotionally and intellectually – the education of his children, the welfare of the poor, 
literary success – have now lost their reason-giving appeal, and he thereby finds himself 
with no clue as to how to live, and no reasons or impetus to live at all. The prospect of 
death undermines, for Tolstoy, the reason–giving force of what he had previously lived by.  
 By contrast, someone who experienced a similar life as meaningful would see 
meaning in what he does: we can imagine, for example, that he would see the work he puts 
into maintaining the estate to be a way to preserve and enrich a beautiful property, his 
efforts to understand the needs of the poor and the best way to help them as a way to 
increase their welfare, his literary creation as a way of adding to and perhaps surpassing 
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the literary achievements of previous generations of writers. And he would see the 
preservation of a beautiful estate and increasing the welfare of the poor as worthwhile, as 
good reasons for his actions and good guides as to how to live. He might have a further 
story about why they are good reasons – a story about God’s will and benevolence, or 
about self-fulfillment or self-actualization, or about living in harmony with the universe – 
or he might not. In any case, his experience of his life as meaningful does not depend on 
the explicit availability of such a story: his experience is one of seeing meaning to what he 
does. That meaning might be backed up by a big-picture story about the universe, but it 
need not be.  
 There are two elements that both seem important in experiencing life as 
meaningful. One is that of experiencing actions and events that make up one’s life as 
having a meaning. And I think that this experience is quite similar to experiencing words, 
sentences or stories as having a meaning. When you see the word “sun” as meaningful, you 
see it as a sign that stands for something else, for its meaning. When you look at the 
written word “sun,” and see it as meaningful, you see more to it than a string of letters, or a 
string of marks on paper: you see those marks as a representation of something else. In 
seeing it as such, the word appears intelligible to you: you understand its meaning.  
 I think that something similar - though not identical - is involved in experiencing 
life as meaningful, and that the need for meaningfulness in life is a need for life to be 
intelligible in a way similar to that in which words or stories are intelligible for us. We 
want there to be more to life and its events than the brute facts; we want them to make 
sense. 
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 But we also want that meaning to be a good one: to be one that shows life to be 
worth living and our endeavors to be worthwhile. Someone who saw himself and others as 
puppets in the hands of a mischievous puppeteer could see life as intelligible in the sense 
described above: his life would have the overall purpose of entertaining the puppeteer’s 
mischievous audience, his pleasures would be a way of being set up for pain, his endeavors 
a way of being set up for failure. His life would be intelligible, but we wouldn’t call it a 
meaningful life: its meaning does not make it richer or worthwhile.  
 I think there are other contexts in which we use the word “meaningful” in a similar 
way. Think of the expressions “a meaningful quote,” “a meaningful movie,” “a meaningful 
gift,” “meaningful sex.” Being intelligible, having a meaning as representations or 
expressions of something else is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for these 
items to be meaningful in the sense intended in these expressions. It is important both that 
these items have a meaning, and that the meaning be of a certain quality. A quote or a 
movie couldn’t be meaningful in the sense of these expressions unless they meant 
something; at the same time, if what they meant was a platitude we wouldn’t call them 
meaningful. But perhaps one could say that in these cases the intelligibility condition has 
less to do with the use of “meaningful” in these expressions than with a necessary 
condition for being a quote or a movie at all. So this first aspect of “meaningful” may be 
easier to see in talk about meaningful gifts or sex. A meaningful gift is, first of all, a gift 
that represents or expresses something; so is meaningful sex. But, of course, what is 
represented or expressed also matters: a gift that represents an insult is not a meaningful 
gift, and sex that expresses anger or power is not what we want to call meaningful sex.112  
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 Sometimes we call a gift meaningful even if its meaning is not a positive one. As Tom Hill pointed out to 
me, we might call Santa’s stones in the stockings a meaningful gift as well. But I think that that is a different 
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 I have talked about experiencing life as meaningful, and about seeing various 
actions and events within a life as meaningful. What is the relationship between the two? 
First, let me say what I don’t think that relationship is. Seeing a life as meaningful isn’t 
simply a matter of seeing various actions within it as meaningful. There are many trivial 
activities that can be seen as meaningful, but seeing them as meaningful has nothing to do 
with a meaningful life. My slamming the door after a fight with my partner or my inserting 
a coin in the parking meter113 are cases in point. If my life is composed only of such 
activities, and I see them as meaningful, this doesn’t mean that I see my life as meaningful. 
I can see all of these activities as worthwhile, and I can have a story about why there are 
good reasons for each of them, but that need not add up to seeing my life as worthwhile, or 
seeing good reasons for living my life. On the other hand, in order to see one’s life as 
meaningful one need not have a story about one’s life as a whole - considered as a single 
item - that explains its meaning, the way we have a story about why an action like thanking 
the waiter is meaningful. One could have such a story, but it is not necessary. That is 
because there are elements of a life whose meaning is such that it radiates to one’s life as a 
whole. The reasons one has for inserting the coin in the parking meter are typically not 
reasons that can make life worth living; but the reasons one has for, say, raising one’s 
children, loving one’s partner, building a community or following one’s vocation can be 
such that they are at the same time, and thereby, reasons to live. This is how I understand 
the common sense platitude that love, friendship, or meaningful work can give meaning to 
one’s life.  
                                                                                                                                                    
use of “meaningful” from the one that is typical to the expression “a meaningful gift”. My point is that there 
is one use of the word “meaningful” that implies that the meaning is a good one, and that that is the use 
present in talk about meaningful lives.  
113
 I owe this example to Susan Wolf. 
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 I would speculate that the experience of meaninglessness is often the result of the 
assumption that life can be meaningful only if we have a story about the meaning of life as 
a whole, and of a failed attempt to apply to life as a whole story patterns that we use, 
successfully, to make sense of events within a life. A very familiar way of making sense of 
actions and events is in terms of their purpose, so it is not surprising if people try and 
expect to make sense of life in terms of a purpose (it’s not surprising if they fail either). 
Similarly, we understand many events by placing them in a larger context – by seeing their 
relevance to something bigger, or more important, which explains why some think that in 
order to have meaning life must be somehow linked to an infinite being, i.e. one for which 
the need to place it in a larger context does not arise.114  
 The idea that the experience of meaningfulness is, in part, the experience of having 
good reasons for living one’s life seems consistent with standard cases of meaningless and 
meaningful lives. It is hard to see good reasons for living a life that consists of nothing but 
the toil of pushing a rock up a hill over and over again, or of growing corn to feed the pigs 
to buy more corn to feed more pigs. By contrast, most people find contributions to science 
or enhancing the lives of others to be good reasons to live a life. 
 What kind of reasons for living one’s life is one after, when one seeks 
meaningfulness? The concern for meaningfulness is not a concern for justifying one’s life 
to others or to oneself. One can think that life is in no need of justification - that (to borrow 
a phrase from David Velleman) one has the right to live by default, without having to 
justify the choice to live - but still worry about meaningfulness.115 At the same time, what 
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right to die,” he argues that an institutionalized right to euthanasia, by making staying alive a matter of 
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one is after are not merely enticing reasons – or, in any case, not any old kind of enticing 
reasons – for living one’s life. Insisting that life is fun, and that that is a good enough 
reason to live, would hardly speak to Tolstoy’s concern.  
 There are, of course, other possibilities, and I would like to suggest that the relevant 
reasons are reasons that integrate life into a story that makes sense of it and shows it to be 
worthwhile. We will come back to this point later. 
 
 What kinds of attitudes of the subject are needed for meaningfulness, and why? 
How do they contribute to meaningfulness? 
 Let’s look at what is missing in the cases of meaningless lives described above. The 
modified Einstein lacks the desire for and interest in scientific discovery; he doesn’t care 
about it. The bored Mother Theresa lacks enthusiasm or excitement about her charity work, 
and takes no pleasure in it. Various philosophers have focused on each of these attitudes, 
and taken them to be essential for meaningfulness. Richard Taylor argues that Sisyphus’ 
life can be made meaningful by giving him a desire to push the rock up the hill.116 Harry 
Frankfurt argues that it is by caring about things that we make them important to us, and 
thus make our life meaningful.117 Joseph Raz suggests that it is by forming, and endorsing 
as valuable, attachments to valuable things.118 Susan Wolf argues that a meaningful life is 
a life of active engagement with things of objective value.119 
                                                                                                                                                    
choice, would take away from the patient the option to stay alive by default – that is, without having to 
justify to himself or others a choice to live.  
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 While these suggestions fit (more or less) with our intuitions and accommodate 
various cases of meaningful or meaningless lives, I find these accounts unsatisfying in that 
they fail to explain why these attitudes are essential for a meaningful life; how do they 
contribute to meaningfulness? As I mentioned, I believe that the needed subjective attitude 
is valuing. In what follows, I will try to explain why it is needed, and how it contributes to 
meaningfulness. 
 One way in which an agent’s attitude of valuing contributes to meaningfulness is 
by providing her with a language in which to interpret her life. It can do so by virtue of the 
norms she is committed to in valuing something. Those norms establish the significance of 
various facts that make up her life. Suppose, for example, that Mary values teaching as her 
vocation. In light of that, the fact that she lives in a village where children have little access 
to and interest in education will mean for her the opportunity to use her talent as a teacher 
and show them the benefits of learning; the fact that their parents are reluctant to send their 
children to school will mean for her a challenge to open their minds; the fact that, after 
years of hard work, she manages to do that will be a great accomplishment, and a reason to 
feel fulfilled; her years of hard work will have the significance of a rewarded effort.   
 Now, one may wonder why one needs to value something in order to have the 
resources to interpret (things in) one’s life as meaningful. Isn’t this what our concepts do 
for us - concepts such as vocation, friendship, quest, success, accomplishment, useful, 
purpose, and so on? I think that, even though such concepts play a role in shaping the way 
in which one values something (as a vocation, as a friend, etc.), it is the valuing that makes 
the language one’s own. If Joan, who hated teaching, and couldn’t care less whether 
underprivileged children can read, ended up living in Mary’s village, with no other means 
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of subsistence than teaching, the same things would have a completely different meaning 
to her: the children’s lack of interest in school would be a pain (or perhaps a relief, if she 
chooses to show up for class and let them do whatever they want as long as she can do 
whatever she wants); the parents’ reluctance to send them to school would be a threat to 
her already meager income; if she ends up working hard, she nevertheless earns next to 
nothing, so her years of hard work will mean wasted time.  
 Imagine that Mary and Joan meet and talk about Joan’s life, and Mary insists: your 
life is meaningful, your years of hard work were not a waste, you accomplished a lot by 
teaching these children how to read, and you should feel proud and fulfilled. I think their 
conversation would be analogous to that of two people who both look at a page covered 
with signs that happen to mean different things in their respective languages. Each of them 
insists that he is right about what the page really means. But the page doesn’t “really” 
mean anything; it means one thing in one language, and another thing in the other’s 
language, and nothing at all in lots of other languages.  
 A critic might object at this point that Joan’s life is also “full of meaning” in the 
sense described above: teaching means boredom, years of hard work mean wasted time, 
her ending up in a village of illiterates means failure, and so on. If a meaningful life is a 
life full of meaning in this sense, then a wasted life will turn out to be meaningful.  
 But a life’s being “full of meaning” is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition 
for living a meaningful life. The fact that one values certain things gives one the resources 
to interpret the events in one’s life. But when we want a life to be meaningful, we don’t 
merely want it to make sense; we want it to make sense in a way that makes it worth 
living.  
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 It wouldn’t make sense to say: “Boredom makes my life worth living.”120 Although 
this is not unintelligible in the way “alks jdfo waie” is, it is close to the way in which “This 
square is diligent” doesn’t make sense: boredom is not the kind of thing that can make a 
life worth living. Boredom is not the kind of thing that humans can value for its own sake, 
and our language reflects that.  
  The idea that valuing contributes to meaningfulness is relatively uncontroversial, 
both amongst philosophers and non-philosophers. It is by loving or caring about things that 
they become meaningful to you, many will say. But in developing this thought, 
philosophers stress mostly the point that by caring about things, they become important to 
you; your valuing things makes them valuable to you – and, in this sense, meaningful to 
you.121 My account underscores a different aspect of the contribution that valuing makes to 
a meaningful life: an agent’s attitude of valuing makes his life intelligible to him, by 
organizing what happens in his life in a structure by virtue of which the “brute facts” gain 
meaning. Valuing thus allows us to interpret life and make sense of it. At the same time, by 
making things valuable to us, valuing enables us to have positive interpretations of life, 
according to which life is worthwhile.  
 The norms one is committed to in valuing play a crucial role in making life 
intelligible. It is those norms that make it possible for events and things to have meaning, 
just like the norms governing the use of words make it possible for words to have meaning. 
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If the only valuing – type attitude we were capable of were desire, our world would be 
much poorer: the only meaning things could have for us would be “desired – undesired.”  
 Equally important for intelligibility is the commitment to the norms. In the absence 
of commitment, the norms would fall flat. They would be as ineffective as semantic norms 
in a community where people chose randomly which word to use when. The norms make 
possible a structure; the commitment keeps the structure in place.  
 In his paper “The Absurd,” Thomas Nagel argues that the sense of absurd arises 
from the clash between two perspectives we can take on our lives. On the one hand, as 
deliberative agents, we need, and take ourselves to have, reasons for action. On the other 
hand, as reflective agents, we are inclined to, and even find it unavoidable, to try and take 
an outside perspective on our practice of reason-giving, as a whole, and to ask whether it is 
justified. We cannot help asking whether, from the point of view of the universe, we have 
reasons for anything.122  
From that outside, transcendental point of view, the fact that our practice of reasons 
is the way it is, or that we have one at all, can only appear arbitrary, Nagel claims. From 
the point of view of the universe, there are no reasons for us to act and live. Thus we find 
ourselves caught between our need for reasons for action, and the awareness that, from a 
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transcendental perspective, there are no such reasons. This is, according to Nagel, where 
the sense of absurd comes from. 
He argues that there is no way out of this dilemma (short of suicide), but that this 
need not worry us: the sense that life is absurd is merely an awareness of our human 
condition – and, one might add, of the nature of reasons – but it does not pose a problem 
that calls for a solution. After all, from the point of view of the universe the absurdity of 
our lives doesn’t matter either.  
Not everyone shares, though, Nagel’s viewpoint that the sense of the absurd does 
not pose a problem, and those who don’t might wonder if there is indeed no way of 
avoiding it. Since, on Nagel’s interpretation of the absurd, the absurd is not in the world, 
but rather in us, in the contradiction between the different perspectives we can take on life, 
the only way one could avoid the absurd would be by refusing to take one perspective or 
another. Nagel himself considers the options, but finds them unfeasible. In particular, he 
says, we cannot, by an act of the will, avoid adopting the point of view of the universe. 
Once aware of the possibility of this point of view, we cannot try to forget it; and before 
we are aware of it, we cannot try to prevent ourselves from becoming aware of it, because 
we don’t know about it yet.  
The sense of absurd does not prevent us from going on with our lives as before, 
says Nagel. “What sustains us, in belief as in action, is not reason or justification, but 
something more basic than these – for we go on in the same way even after we are 
convinced that the reasons have given out. If we tried to rely entirely on reason, and 
pressed it hard, our lives and beliefs would collapse – a form of madness that may actually 
 126 
occur if the inertial force of taking the world and life for granted is somehow lost. If we 
lose our grip on that, reason will not give it back to us.”123  
The picture suggested here is that, even when reason finds out and insists that 
nothing is, ultimately, a reason for action, life kicks in and pushes one along, forcing one 
to act as if there were reasons for action.  
I think that this picture brings out an interesting question about what it is to see 
something as a reason for action. One might think that to see something as a reason for 
action is to believe that it is a reason. As deliberative agents, we believe that we have 
reasons for action; but, as self-reflective agents, we can also reason our way to the belief 
that, from the point of view of the universe, there are no reasons for action; and the 
situation we thus place ourselves in is absurd. Though absurd, our situation is not tragic, 
because life goes on as before. The lives we live are absurd, but we live them. This 
suggests that reason is the one that can answer the question of what we have reasons to do, 
but – luckily, albeit absurdly - life doesn’t listen to reason.  
I think it’s worth taking seriously the possibility that life gets the question of 
reasons right, and that Reason, when it departs on its own and leaves life behind, can get it 
wrong. It could be that the absurd arises when one over-intellectualizes reasons, and when 
one identifies seeing something as a reason with believing it to be a reason. Nagel might be 
wrong that adopting the point of view of the universe is an unavoidable consequence of our 
self-reflectiveness. It may be an unavoidable consequence of our over-intellectualizing 
reasons – that is, of our tendency to think that it is Reason that can and should determine 
what constitutes a reason for action. In the passage quoted from Nagel, life seems to be a 
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brute force that acts on us no matter what Reason decides about reasons. One different way 
of thinking about it is that what we are forced, by life, to take as reasons, are, in fact, the 
reasons, no matter what reason might decide in its purely theoretical exercise. If this is 
right, the absurd can be avoided – not by refusing to think from the perspective of the 
universe; but by refusing to take that perspective as the correct perspective on what we 
have reason to do, as determining what we should see as reasons.  
I believe that one reason why valuing is essential for the meaningfulness of one’s 
life is that, when one values something, one’s commitment to seeing it as valuable renders 
the transcendental perspective, the point of view of the universe, moot. When one values 
something, one sees it as a reason in a way that is immune to the shift in perspective 
brought about by the reflective adoption of the point of view of the universe.  
I think the experience of the absurd is similar to the one you have when you stare  
at an image or repeat a word long enough for it to lose its meaning and seem gibberish. 
You cease to see or hear it as a word, as a unit of meaning – i.e., to interpret it via semantic 
rules; instead, you perceives it as a mere string of letters or sounds. Your knowing that 
what is in front of you is a word, and even your capacity to define the word if asked to, 
doesn’t remove the experience of its meaninglessness. Similarly, I think that one 
experiences life as absurd when one lingers long enough in the purely intellectual 
perspective on reasons for the norms that enable meaningfulness to lose their grip on one, 
that is, long enough so that one ceases to see the world via those norms. One’s belief or 
knowledge that many things in one’s life, including life itself, are valuable, is not enough 
to counter this experience of absurdity, just like the knowledge that the image one is 
staring at is a meaningful word is not enough to dispel the experience of it as meaningless. 
 128 
One needs to see the object as valuable, to value it – to see it via the norms that confer its 
significance. You can even imagine someone who, after staring long enough at words in 
that way, became convinced that that is the right perspective on words, that it reveals the 
truth about words - namely, that they are, in fact, meaningless, nothing more than a string 
of letters. The nihilist who becomes convinced that his life has no meaning seems to me to 
be in a similar predicament.  
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